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Abstract
Thesis Statement: Availability-dependent global predicates can be efficiently and scalably
realized for a class of distributed services, in spite of specific selfish and colluding behaviors, using
local and decentralized protocols.
Several types of large-scale distributed systems spanning the Internet have to deal with
availability variations among their constituent nodes. In dealing with churn and low availability
nodes, we believe it is important to link the availability of a node to the service the node receives
from the distributed system. In other words, high availability has to be incentivized with better
service. There are two types of requirements for this problem. First, metrics such as message
overhead, CPU usage, memory overhead and latency need to be optimized to achieve scalability
and efficiency. Secondly, in open distributed systems spanning multiple organizations, the
protocols have to tolerate selfish and colluding nodes, i.e., low availability nodes that attempt to
receive better service.
This thesis approaches this problem by explicitly linking each node’s service to its availability,
via the notion of a global predicate. We present a class of novel distributed protocols that achieve a
given availability-dependent global predicate, efficiently and scalably. These protocols execute in a
fully decentralized manner, realizing the global predicates in an emergent fashion. Predicate
satisfaction is resilient to churn, and to selfish and colluding nodes. The eventual goal of the
predicates is to help incentivize nodes to improve their availability in order to get better service.
Our approach includes using random and consistent techniques to build overlays, as well as
probabilistic local actions such as message forwarding, monitoring, and auditing. This combination
of techniques leads to realizing the predicates, and to probabilistic tolerance to failures, both
churn-related as well as from selfish and colluding behaviors.
Concretely, this thesis makes three major contributions that are closely related to each other.
First we present AVMON, the first distributed availability monitoring service. AVMON builds
random and consistent overlays for accurate and decentralized monitoring of the long term
ii
availability of each node. Second, we present AVMEM, the first availability-aware overlay. Nodes
in AVMEM build their membership by using a globally assigned predicate, leveraging our AVMON
work. On top of AVMEM we implement management functions that query nodes based on their
availability — range/threshold multicast and range/threshold anycast. Finally, we present
AVCOL, the first availability-aware network aggregation system that realizes
availability-dependent predicates. The predicates specify the probability that a node’s aggregate
becomes part of the global aggregate, as a function of the node’s availability.
We evaluate our systems through mathematical analysis, and thorough experimentation. We
carry out our experiments using synthetic and real system traces. Our results demonstrate the
probabilistic correctness, scalability, fault-tolerance, and efficiency of our protocols.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The usefulness of the Internet as a tool for business, free speech, science, entertainment, social
networking, etc., has visibly given rise to many new large-scale distributed systems and
applications. These systems contain many thousands of online users and hosts. Examples include
peer-to-peer (P2P) systems implementing file storage [22, 73, 88], multimedia streaming [15, 60], file
distribution [20], research overlays and Grids [14, 48, 76,103], globally distributed content delivery
networks and publish-subscribe systems [35, 84], data centers with thousands of nodes for
data-intensive computing and cloud computing [1, 9, 25], etc. In spite of the variety visible in this
list, protocols running inside these systems share many common goals, such as being able to scale
with thousands of nodes, and yet perform operations efficiently, i.e., with low bandwidth, response
time, and overhead per client. These protocols include monitoring, aggregation, membership,
querying, etc. — this list comprises the focus of this thesis.
Many of the above systems have to deal with the phenomenon of churn. Churn refers to rapid
and continuous arrival and departure, failure, and birth and death, of nodes in the distributed
system. Churn and low availability nodes can make the functioning of the distributed system
unreliable, unstable, and bandwidth-expensive [13,19,39,66,79,89]. The availability of client nodes
in widely deployed distributed systems varies widely across both time and across nodes. For
instance, in the Overnet P2P system 50% of hosts have a 10-day availability lower than 30% [12],
while average churn rate is 30% per hour. This heterogeneity across space and time is visible even
in Grid applications, e.g., Grid5000 designers report that each machine reboots several tens of
times per day, depending on the applications that are scheduled to run on it [14]. Even clusters for
cloud computing have to deal with dozens of nodes failing per day. Such availability variation has
recently led to the design of many strategies for distributed computing problems that have to deal
with availability, e.g., storage, replication, multicast, etc. [13,19,39,66,78,89]. These strategies aim
to make such distributed systems churn-resistant and churn-adaptive.
Orthogonally, in addition to this heterogeneity, several researchers and industrial companies
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have pointed out the dire need for monitoring and management of end-user distributed
applications. Jim Gray opined that management was the most difficult problem for any
distributed system [75]. The 2005 NSF report on “Grand Challenges in Distributed Computer
Systems” lists among its primary concerns real-time management, automated monitoring, and
dealing with heterogeneity in distributed systems [29]. Moreover, end-user applications routinely
form 24% to 33% of the TCO (Total Cost of Ownership) of today’s clusters [96].
Finally, it is well-known that P2P and Grid systems (e.g., SETI@Home, Folding@Home, or
spread over multiple institutions) consist of many nodes that are selfish and would like to obtain
maximum benefit from the distributed system, in spite of their low availability. For instance, Adar
and Huberman point out in [6] that as many as 70% of nodes in Gnutella are freeloaders, i.e.,
nodes that take advantage of Gnutella’s file sharing without contributing back to Gnutella. This
uncooperative behavior continues to be a common problem in open distributed systems [20, 32, 62].
The literature contains several distributed protocols that are tolerant to selfish and colluding
behaviors, as well as maliciousness (see Section 1.4.4).
1.1 Availability in this Thesis
Before we continue, we clearly define the term “availability” as used in the remainder of this
thesis. We define availability as the fraction of time that a node is online. For example, a node
that is online each day for six hours has an availability = 624 = 0.25. The time-scale at which the
availability is measured is flexible from our point of view, e.g., one availability-aware system may
find it convenient to use the current life-time of the system, another system may find it useful to
define a 5 hour moving window, and yet another system may use multiple weighted time-scales.
1.2 Our Approach
The approach we take in this thesis is to explicitly address the availability variations and the
selfish behavior of the nodes. To do this, we link the availability of the node to the service that the
node receives from the system. This incentivizes each node to have higher availability, in order to
obtain better service. This link between availability and service is implemented using
availability-dependent predicates. The predicates are globally assigned, i.e., they are decided by an
administrator, they are known by all the nodes in the system, and use node availability as input.
Nodes cannot cheat since our protocols tolerate selfish and colluding behavior.
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That tolerance is in part a consequence of three goals met by our global predicates, along with
the protocols that implementing them: consistency, randomness, verifiability. The result given by
a predicate is consistent, in spite of system changes such as membership. Randomness refers to the
probabilistic behavior of the predicates and protocols. Verifiability means that the result given by
a predicate can be verified by any node in the system, including a node that is not directly affected
by the value given by the predicate. These ideas seem a little abstract, but they will be made
concrete for each of our systems in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
In addition to the previous goals, the predicates need to be realized scalably and efficiently,
i.e., the protocols that implement their evaluation must be fully decentralized and incur low
overhead. As we’ll see in the following chapters, the global behavior of the predicates is realized in
an emergent fashion resulting from local node interactions. We will also explain how consistency,
randomness and verifiability help in the scalability of the protocols that help realize the predicates.
Beyond Availability. Linking the service that a node receives from the system to a system
level metric — that node’s availability — is an important research contribution, as it improves
churn and allows the creation of novel availability-aware protocols. Nevertheless, the reader might
wonder about a number of issues and a number of possibilities beyond this particular
availability/service link. Some of these are outlined next.
Our approach can be seen as the sub-set of a more general idea — linking the service received
by a node from the system, to that node’s contribution to that system. In our case, of course, we
focus on node-level availability as the contribution, because this contribution decreases churn, and
decreases the overhead related to the maintenance of the system’s invariants.
First, two nodes with the same availability may not necessarily do the same amount of work in
the application layer, e.g., a node with a slow CPU will contribute less computation cycles to the
system. In a similar way, two nodes with the same availability may not necessarily have (or give to
the system) the same bandwidth, thus potentially doing less work.
Second, we are addressing systems where we expect nodes to be online to execute operations
on demand (e.g., multicasting queries or aggregation) or periodically (e.g., aggregation or
monitoring). In a system where operations can be performed in batch by a node, after it comes
back online, the number of operations can be considered as that node’s contribution.
If a contribution monitoring service is developed for the previous cases, systems like AVCOL
and AVMEM can work in the previous situations, by using that contribution monitoring service
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Figure 1.1: AV*-stack: relationship between AVMON and the availability-aware systems.
instead of AVMON.
Finally, our availability-dependent global predicates are not intended for energy constrained
systems such as sensor networks, or mobile ad hoc networks. This is a consequence of our
approach, i.e., incentivizing nodes to be more available will consume more energy. Nevertheless,
the ideas presented to realize global predicates in a fully decentralized manner could be useful in
these environments, if a metric other than availability is explored.
All these ideas are worth exploring, and are left for future research (see Section 7).
1.3 Contributions
Thesis Statement: Availability-dependent global predicates can be efficiently and scalably
realized for a class of distributed services, in spite of specific selfish and colluding behaviors, using
local and decentralized protocols.
The concrete contributions of this thesis are:
1. AVMON [2,70, 72], the first scalable and efficient availability monitoring overlay. AVMON
builds overlays that help in monitoring of long-term availability histories of hosts, with a
focus on large-scale distributed settings where hosts may be selfish or colluding (but not
malicious). Concretely, we focus on the important problems of selection and discovery of
such an availability monitoring overlay. We motivate six significant goals for these problems
— the first three goals are consistency, verifiability, and randomness, in selecting the
availability monitors of nodes, so as to be probabilistically resilient to selfish and colluding
nodes. The next three goals are discoverability, load-balancing, and scalability in finding
these monitors. AVMON is an availability monitoring overlay that is the first system to
satisfy all the above six requirements. From an algorithmic point of view, we contribute a
range of protocols for discovering the availability monitoring overlay in a scalable and
efficient manner, given any arbitrary monitor selection scheme that is consistent and
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verifiable. We mathematically analyze the performance of AVMON’s discovery protocols
w.r.t. scalability and discovery time of monitors. Most interestingly, we are able to derive
optimal variants of AVMON, with the aim of minimizing memory, bandwidth, computation,
and discovery time of monitors (or a subset of these metrics). Our analysis indicates that
these optimal variants are also practically feasible. Our experiment results demonstrate that
AVMON would work well in a wide variety of distributed systems.
2. AVMEM [69], the first availability-aware overlay to date. AVMEM is intended for generic
non-cooperative scenarios where nodes may be selfish and may wish to route messages to a
large set of other nodes, especially if the selfish node has low availability. Under this setting,
our concrete contributions are the following: (1) AVMEM allows arbitrary classes of
application-specified predicates to create the membership relationships in the overlay. In
order to avoid selfish nodes from exploiting the system, we focus on predicates that are
random and consistent. In other words, whether a given node y is a neighbor of a given node
x is decided based on a consistent and probabilistic predicate, dependent solely on the
identifiers and availabilities of these two nodes, but without using any external inputs. (2)
AVMEM protocols discover and maintain the overlay spanned by the application-specified
AVMEM predicate in a scalable and fast manner. (3) We use AVMEM to execute important
availability-based management operations, focusing on range-anycast, range-multicast,
threshold-anycast, and threshold-multicast. AVMEM works well in the presence of selfish
nodes, scales to thousands of nodes, and executes each of the targeted operations quickly and
reliably. Our experiments show that AVMEM works well in practical settings.
3. AVCOL [71], the first availability-aware aggregation system. AVCOL uses probabilistic and
gossip-style techniques to provide availability-aware aggregation. AVCOL is the first
aggregation system that: (1) implements any (arbitrary) global predicate that explicitly
specifies any node’s probability of inclusion in the global aggregate, as a mathematical
function of that node’s availability; (2) probabilistically tolerates large numbers of selfish
nodes and large groups of colluders; and (3) scales well with hundreds to thousands of nodes.
AVCOL uses several unique design decisions: per-aggregation tree construction where nodes
are allowed a limited but flexible probabilistic choice of parents or children, probabilistic
aggregation along trees, and auditing of nodes both during aggregation as well as in gossip
style (i.e., periodically). Our evaluation and our mathematical analysis show that AVCOL
satisfies arbitrary predicates, scales well, and withstands a variety of selfish and colluding
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attacks.
4. Trace-Driven simulation: we perform extensive experimental evaluations of our systems by
using three types of availability traces — synthetic, from PlanetLab, and from a P2P system
(Overnet).
Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the proposed systems. Both AVMEM and AVCOL
sit on top of AVMON, because they leverage AVMON as a service that provides information on
node availability for each node in the network. The measured node availability is used by AVMEM
and AVCOL to realize their predicates. Notice that the past AVCAST work can also be
implemented on top of AVMON, even though AVCAST defined its own availability monitoring.
Further availability-aware systems would also be implemented atop AVMON. Similarly, all the
availability prediction and availability-dependent systems mentioned in Section 1.4 could use
AVMON to provide them with individual node availability.
1.4 Related Research
In this section we explore existing approaches that deal with churn, node availability variations,
and selfishness. The following discussion presents a sample of the existing work in the literature,
although it is representative, it is not meant to be exhaustive.
1.4.1 Measurement and Prediction of Availability
There are a number of important measurement studies that deal with availability variations in
distributed systems. Bhagwan [12] presents an important study of the availability dynamics in the
Overnet P2P file sharing network. The centralized monitoring tool used in this study crawls the
system to find random nodes, in 20 minute intervals. As nodes have a unique and fixed identifier
in Overnet, independent of their IP address, this study made obsolete all previous similar studies
that used IP address to identify nodes — due to the prevalence of network address translators and
DHCP, nodes can use a different IP address between sessions, leading to availability
under-estimation. A relevant result is that over 20% of the nodes in the system arrive and depart
in the same day — this is high churn.
Stutzbach and Rejaie make a more detailed study of churn in [94]. In their work they monitor
deployed BitTorrent [20, 80], eMule [3] and Gnutella [110] networks. The use of a more
sophisticated node crawler, Cruiser [93], allows them to efficiently measure the whole network in 4
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to 10 minutes. This, in turn, allowed them to explore more metrics in more detail — metrics that
would not have been reliably measured with 20 minute intervals [12]. Among those metrics they
studied, session-length distribution, inter-arrival distribution, node uptime distribution, node
downtime, and a number of correlations between the metrics. One interesting result is that the
past session length of a node is a good predictor of its future session length. Another relevant
result is that the availability of a node across two consecutive days is highly correlated.
Measurements are useful to understand the dynamic behavior of these systems. Additionally,
they are the first step to be able to predict future node behavior. Mickens et al studied [66] a
number of availability prediction techniques that can be useful in distributed applications —
saturating counter predictors, state based predictors and noise tolerance, and linear predictors.
Mickens et al applied these predictors to real system traces taken from Overnet, Microsoft’s LAN,
and PlanetLab. They find that accurate predictions of future node availability can be achieved.
Furthermore, they show how to use this prediction to create a replication system that saves
bandwidth by placing replicas according to the future availability of the nodes.
The previous availability studies designed special crawlers to determine if nodes are online or
oﬄine, and thus collect availability data. Our AVMON system can certainly be used to collect
availability data of a running P2P system; but, in contrast to their crawlers, an AVMON process
would have to run in each node. Finally, prediction techniques such as those studied by Mickens et
al [66] can be implemented on top of AVMON — notice that Mickens et al assumed the presence
of some reliable availability monitoring system.
1.4.2 Handling Churn
Godfrey [39] studies a number of node replacement strategies used to replace failed nodes, in
particular Random Replacement, and demonstrates how they can improve the reliability of the
system by decreasing its churn. These replacement strategies are availability-dependent.
Similarly to Godfrey’s, Qiao et al [81] propose organizational protocols for loosely-structured
P2P networks, where the expected session time of the nodes is used to organize connections among
the nodes, thus minimizing churn.
Li et al compare four DHTs in [57] — Chord [92], Kelips [41], Tapestry [107] and
Kademlia [65] — to test how well they behave in the face of churn while their basic system
parameters are tuned — parameters such as Chord’s finger stabilization interval, Kelips’s gossiping
interval, Tapestry’s number of backup nodes, Kademlia’s number of parallel searches, among
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others. They find that with properly tuned parameters all these systems perform well; but,
properly tuning the parameters is a function of the system workload, i.e., churn.
Rhea et al present a number of protocols to minimize churn in a DHT [85]. They explore
proactive and periodic recovery from node failure, TCP-style timeouts in recursive lookup
messages, and global sampling of the network for proximity network selection.
This thesis can improve churn in large-scale systems, due to the proposed global predicates,
that explicitly link a node’s availability and the service that that node receives from the system.
Moreover, with AVMON’s help it is easier to implement systems that require node knowledge such
as a node’s session time.
1.4.3 Availability-aware Protocols
Besides measurement, prediction and designs that directly tackle churn, some systems that deal
with the heterogeneity of node availability have been proposed. Bhagwan et al created Total
Recall [13], a distributed file storage system that relies on availability prediction of its constituent
nodes to decide when to repair missing replicas — the objective of the replica repair mechanism is
to ensure that files have a guaranteed availability. Chun et al present Carbonite [19], a replication
strategy dependent on node availability, whose goal is to ensure the durability (instead of
availability) of the stored objects.
Pongthawornkamol’s AVCAST [77,78, 79] presents availability-dependent gossiping protocols,
where receiving nodes with higher availability will get better message delivery reliability from the
system (compared to nodes with lower availability). AVCAST is the first system that explicitly
links the availability of a node and the service it receives — this thesis can be seen as (1) an
expansion and extension of the AVCAST Master’s thesis to a larger class of distributed computing
problems, and (2) has techniques that are more efficient and scalable. Before AVCAST, some
existing systems implicitly linked the availability of a node and the service received by the node;
while others did not. An example of the former are nodes in Gnutella — the more time a node
spent online, the more it would learn about available files by caching the results of search queries
relayed through it. As for the latter, consider Total Recall, where the availability of the files
inserted by a node are not related to the inserting-node’s availability.
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1.4.4 Non-cooperative Distributed Systems
Internet-wide distributed systems spanning multiple administrative domains will have to deal with
selfish node behavior, i.e., nodes that deterministically deviate from the protocol in order to
maximize some local utility function. The classical example of selfishness are
freeloaders [6, 20, 32, 62] — nodes that use the services provided by the system, without
contributing their fair share to the system, e.g., nodes that do not share files in file sharing
networks, nodes that do not stream to other nodes in P2P streaming networks.
A popular approach to deal with such behavior is to design protocols that tolerate Byzantine
failures, such as Lamport et al ’s [55], Rabin’s [83], Castro and Liskov’s [16], Yin et al ’s [106].
Unfortunately Byzantine fault tolerance limits scalability, even if randomization is used [17], or if
variants such as Kotla et al ’s Zyzzyva [54] are used, where speculation is exploited to simplify the
replicated state machine. PeerReview [43] detects Byzantine failures using secure logs and
auditing, however it does not specify how to select witnesses safely — our AVMON (Chapter 3)
approach can be used instead to do the selection.
Another interesting approach is the Byzantine/Altruistic/Rational (BAR) fault tolerance
model [7, 56] — altruistic refers to nodes that follow the protocol, and rational nodes are those
that deviate from the protocol to maximize a local function without hurting the system.
Perhaps the best approach to deal with selfish nodes is to provide them with incentives to be
more available, behave altruistically, and according to the protocol, i.e., to entice them to
contribute their fair share to the system. Feldman et al [32] study how the penalization of
freeloaders improves their contribution. Cohen’s popular BitTorrent used to have a tit-for-tat
mechanism to ensure proper sharing of file chunks among peers [20]. Locher et al show in [62] that
using time-constrained tit-for-tat exchanges in P2P multimedia streaming, incentivizes freeloaders
to become cooperative, as otherwise their streaming would degrade. Feldman et al show in [31]
that exchanging node history, using a game theoretic approach, improves overall P2P system
performance, as selfish and colluding nodes can be identified and then penalized. Damiani et
al [23] built a reputation mechanism using distributed polling to ensure the reliability of shared
resources. Walsh and Sirer [102] created a P2P reputation system based on user voting, to prevent
file pollution in file-sharing networks such as Gnutella — they find that it detects random or
malicious voting, and helps users avoid corrupt files. Another P2P reputation system is Xiong and
Liu [104]’s PeerTrust, whereby building a trust metric that combines trust parameters such as peer
feedback, credibility of feedback and transactions performed by a node, they manage to prevent
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nodes from distributing malicious content in the P2P network.
However, all the above approaches only implicitly link a node’s availability to the service it gets.
This implicit approach is not comprehensive or predictable across nodes and time, thus it might
not meet the goals of incentivizing nodes to be more available. Additionally, our approach is
incentivizes nodes to be more available by linking a node’s availability to the service it receives
from the system. This link is done using global predicates that are consistent, random and
verifiable — a completely novel approach to the problem.
1.4.5 Gossiping Overlays
Several systems have aimed to build a random membership graph among the nodes of a distributed
system. The SCAMP membership system [38] works by having each joining node initiate several
joining requests which then undergo random walks and probabilistic inclusion in the membership
lists of recipient nodes. The CYCLON system [100] works by having each node periodically
exchange its neighbor lists with a random neighbor, and pick a new neighbor list from the union of
these lists. T-Man [49] is yet another membership protocol that is able to support a generic class
of membership graph predicates, thus allowing arbitrary membership graphs (such as random
ones) to be formed by local node actions. There are important differences between T-Man and our
work. AVMEM, for example, builds graph that are availability-aware. Moreover, the links created
by AVMEM in its graph are consistent, random, and verifiable — T-Man does not meet these
three goals at once. Links in AVMEM are resilient to selfish and colluding behavior, unlike T-Man.
Somewhat like SCAMP, AVMON uses a random spanning tree approach to have joining nodes
inform a subset of other nodes of their presence. AVMON also uses a mechanism similar to (but
simpler than) CYCLON to constantly change the neighbor lists of nodes. While the goal of
CYCLON was to have the neighbor lists change to combat system churn, AVMON’s goal is to also
use the neighbor lists to discover monitoring relationships among node pairs. Although AVMON
has a few design decisions similar to some of the above systems (as noted), none of these systems
addresses availability monitoring as a first class problem. While the constructed membership
graphs are random, the conditions of consistency and verifiability are not addressed by these
systems. Finally, AVMEM and AVCOL are designed to leverage systems like CYCLON or T-Man,
in order to discover nodes in the system; but for simplicity and optimality, they use AVMON’s
partial view of the system.
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Chapter 2
System Model and Assumptions
In this chapter we outline the system model and assumptions that are common to the design of
our protocols, to our system implementations, and to our mathematical analysis. Where
applicable, we note the differences in the assumptions made between mathematical analysis and
system implementation. In many cases, our assumptions follow literature. In other cases, we
justify what we assume. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 further specify assumptions that are specific to each
one of them. Our assumptions fall into two classes — (1) large-scale distributed systems and (2)
non-cooperative behavior.
2.1 Large-scale Distributed Systems
The scenarios targeted in this thesis include large-scale distributed systems such as PlanetLab [76],
overlays [8], P2P systems [40, 92, 110], grid computing [34] and cloud computing [9]. Motivated by
this, we make the following assumptions.
1. Hosts are heterogeneous.
2. A host can run one or more processes.
3. Each of these processes is called a node in our distributed system.
4. Each node has a unique identifier, e.g., public key, <IP address, port number>, or user id’s
in a P2P system [12].
5. We assume point to point communications. To make our mathematical analysis tractable,
communications are assumed to be over a synchronous network — this means message delays
are bounded. However, our implementations assume that communications happen over an
asynchronous network — a lost message cannot be distinguished from a delayed message.
6. Nodes can communicate reliably with any other node, e.g., using the TCP/IP protocol stack.
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7. Nodes have an internal clock. Our mathematical analysis assumes, for tractability, that the
clocks are synchronized. However, our implementations assume that clocks are not
synchronized.
8. In our mathematical analysis we assume that messages sent between nodes are not lost or
delayed. Implemented systems assume that messages sent between nodes could be lost or
delayed.
9. A node can suffer a crash-stop failure at any time.
10. We cannot distinguish between a failed node and a slow node [33].
11. Nodes that suffer a crash-stop failure can recover and rejoin the system, or they can stay
failed for the lifespan of the system. We assume that they rejoin the system with the same
identifier.
12. Each node can join or leave the system at any time. System-wide this causes unpredictable
churn. A node that is in the system is said to be online, otherwise it is oﬄine.
13. We do not distinguish between nodes that cleanly leave the system and nodes that fail.
14. Nodes are assumed to have persistent storage that can be retrieved only when the node is
online.
15. We define availability as the fraction of time that a node is online. The time-scale at which
the availability is measured is flexible from our point of view, e.g., one availability aware
system may find it convenient to use the current life-time of the system, while another
system may find it useful to define a 5 hour moving window, while yet another system may
use multiple weighted time-scales.
16. We assume that the number of nodes that are online at a particular point in time, N , is
stable and known to all nodes. In practice, this assumption is justified even under system
churn. For instance, in the Overnet P2P system [12] the online node population size varies
by a factor of 2 over a week and by a factor of 3 over a month. Furthermore, [18, 93] show
that the Gnutella system size varies within a factor of 2 per day and per month, and [46]
shows that in P2P streaming systems the size varies within a factor of 9 per day and per
week. Similar behavior has been reported in [94] for BitTorrent and the Kademlia-based
eMule [3] P2P network. Therefore, our systems and protocols can use a system-wide
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parameter N , set to an approximate value. Moreover, N can be updated infrequently (e.g.,
once a month) without hurting scalability — the update could use a central trusted server
that assigns version numbers for each N value update, along with a gossiping [26, 42]
protocol to ensure propagation. Alternatively, the estimate size can be determined in a
distributed manner by existing protocols such as [53]. Otherwise, N can be known a priori in
the case of a Grid system or cloud computing cluster. Our experiments evaluate the effect of
this assumption under real life variation of system size.
2.2 Non-cooperative Behavior
We consider a particular subclass of open distributed systems, where nodes exhibit the following
characteristics:
1. A selfish node behavior will want to misrepresent its availability as higher than its real value,
in order to obtain better service from the distributed protocol.
2. Selfish nodes may collude in groups. A colluding node will extend its selfish behavior to also
benefit other nodes in its colluder group. The number of colluding nodes is fixed. Colluding
relationships are already present before the system starts running, and nodes are not
compromised thereafter. The specific nature of the collusion is explained in Chapters 3, 4, 5.
3. A node that is selfish and has low availability will try to receive the system services that are
available to high availability nodes, without actually improving its availability.
4. Nodes have unique identifiers and cannot spoof messages, otherwise a Sybil attack [27] would
be unavoidable.
5. Nodes do not behave in Byzantine or rational manners [7, 16]. Instead, our selfish and
colluding behavior is a subset of rational and Byzantine behaviors. We chose not to directly
address these general failure models, because they would imply sacrifice of scalability (this
makes great sense since BFT protocols are not scalable).
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Chapter 3
Availability Monitoring
3.1 Motivation
In order to support availability-dependent predicates in distributed services, one needs to
necessarily rely on the presence of an underlying availability monitoring service. This is the focus
of this chapter. The high-level goal of an availability monitoring service is to maintain long-term
availability information for each node in the system. While a few availability monitoring solutions
have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [13, 19, 78]), the generic availability monitoring problem
has not been addressed as yet. This thesis is the first to explicitly define goals for the availability
monitoring problem, to address these goals with a general and overlay-independent solution, and
to explore the optimality of discovery protocols for the overlay.
The problem challenge, in the availability monitoring overlay problem, comes from the fact
that nodes may be selfish or colluding. Such nodes are not malicious, but report
higher-than-measured availabilities for themselves and their “friend” nodes (we will elaborate on
this soon). Yet, the benefits of an availability monitoring service that overcomes this challenge, are
numerous and varied. Applications that rely on such a service include availability-based replica
selection [13, 19, 39, 89], availability-based parent selection in overlay multicast trees [39], and
implementation of availability-based reliability predicates for multicast [78]. In fact, Godfrey et al
recently showed in [39] that with detailed availability history about each node in the system, one
can design “smart” node selection strategies for replication of a service or a file, and that these
outperform availability-agnostic strategies. Finally, availability histories of nodes can even be used
to predict availability of individual nodes in the future, e.g., as shown in [66].
3.2 Problem Statement
Concretely, this availability monitoring problem consists of two orthogonal sub-problems:
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I Selection and Discovery of the Availability Monitoring Overlay: for each node x, select and
discover a list of nodes who monitor node x
II Availability History Maintenance: what is the exact mechanism used by a monitor of a given
node x to store x’s availability history.
While several different techniques have been proposed for the sub-problem II, i.e., how a
monitor maintains history (see, e.g., [13, 66]), the solution space for the sub-problem I is relatively
less-explored. In other words, any existing technique for availability history maintenance (e.g.,
raw, aged, recent, etc. [66]) can be used orthogonally with a given availability monitoring overlay.
Thus, our focus in this chapter is only on the more challenging sub-problem I above: of
selection and discovery of the Availability Monitoring Overlay. Formally, this problem can be
stated as follows (following the notation of [78]):
For each node x, select and discover a small subset of nodes to monitor x. Denote this
monitoring set of x as PS(x), called the pinging set of node x. Each of the nodes in
PS(x) is responsible for monitoring node x’s long-term availability history. Similarly,
node x might in turn be asked to monitor the availability of a small set of other nodes
— this is called TS(x), or the target set of x. The TS and PS relationships are
inverses of each other.
3.3 Assumptions and System Model
In this section we elaborate and extend the assumptions and the model presented in Chapter 2, for
the monitoring problem.
1. Recall that a selfish node x will try to manipulate the system in order to make the system
believe that x’s reported availability is higher than x’s actual availability — we call this
availability over-reporting. Such a selfish node could manage to obtain higher reliability from
multicast [39, 78], or cause service outage for systems that rely on high availability
nodes [13, 19, 39, 89]. This makes the design of an availability monitoring service challenging,
and none of the existing solutions in literature appear to solve this problem.
2. Colluders of a selfish node always misreport its availability, attempting to make the
availability seem higher.
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3. Notice that avoiding availability under-reporting requires tracking nodes’ application activity,
and thus an application-specific solution. Our goal is only application-independent solutions.
4. We say that a node is born if it joins the system for the first time. Nodes may also die, i.e.,
leave the system for good. Deaths are silent and not explicit, i.e., a node may leave or fail for
the last time without specifying it was a death.
5. The persistent storage available at each node used to store availability information about
other monitored nodes.
3.4 Goals
To address all the challenges we have mentioned, we first specify six goals for our problem — later,
Section 3.7 shows how to realize these goals. The first three goals are for the selection of the
pinging set of a node — consistency, verifiability, and randomness. In addition, we also desire
discoverability, i.e., a node should be able to locate its pinging set and target set quickly and easily,
and in a manner that is load-balanced and scalable. These six requirements can be stated
concretely as follows:
1. Consistency: Given two nodes x, y, the relationship of whether or not y ∈ PS(x), should be
consistent, i.e., this relationship should not change due to any factors such as joining and
leaving of nodes in the system, variation of size of the system, etc. This ensures that each
node will always be monitored by a consistent set of other nodes, regardless of whatever else
happens in the system. Consistency is required in order to maintain long-term availability
history of node x at each of its monitors, and to avoid having to transfer such histories upon
node churn. Consistency can also avoid pollution of monitoring node sets with colluders.
Finally, consistency is related to the next important property called Verifiability.
2. Verifiability: Given two nodes x, y, any third node should be able to correctly verify whether
y ∈ PS(x) or not. This is an important requirement as this prevents selfish nodes from
selecting and advertising its colluding nodes as being in its PS(x).
3. Randomness: This requirement stands for uniform randomness, and says that given a node
x, PS(x) should contain other nodes picked uniformly at random: (a) in an identically
distributed fashion, and (b) independently of one another. Condition (a) both reduces the
chances of a node’s colluder being one of its monitors, and helps in load-balancing.
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Condition (b) reduces the chance that groups of nodes will be correlated in being present
together in several pinging sets. Such correlation can be harmful since a group of colluding
nodes, appearing together in multiple pinging sets, could potentially jeopardize availability
calculation for all these monitored nodes.
4. Discoverability: Any node x should be able to discover its PS(x) and TS(x) quickly.
Further, any other node y should be able to locate at least a constant number of (any) given
node x’s PS(x). This enables protocols using the availability service,
e.g., [13, 19, 39, 66, 78, 89], to gather information about individual nodes’ availability. We do
not consider the problem of aggregating node availability histories.
5. Load Balancing: For discovery of pinging sets, the message overhead, memory overhead, and
computational overhead, should each be uniformly distributed across all nodes.
6. Scalability: For discovery of pinging sets, the per-node message overhead, computational
overhead, and memory overhead should each be low and scalable.
In-Brief Contributions of this Chapter: We present AVMON, the first complete system for
selection and discovery of an availability monitoring overlay, in order to satisfy all the six
properties of consistency, verifiability, randomness, discoverability, load-balance, and scalability.
The two core algorithmic contributions of the current Chapter are: (i) a distributed, efficient,
scalable, and load-balanced algorithm for discovery of monitors according to any consistent and
verifiable selection scheme, and (ii) derivation of optimal variants of this discovery protocol, in
order to optimize different combinations from among the metrics of memory and communication
bandwidth (M), discovery time (D), and computation complexity (C). Specifically, for (ii), we
discover three variants of AVMON that satisfy different optimality conditions —- MD (optimal
w.r.t. M and D), DC (optimal w.r.t. D and C), and MDC (optimal w.r.t. M, D, and C). The
AVMON system uses the consistent hash-based pinging set selection leveraged from [78] — we
describe this briefly and assume it in the rest of the Chapter. The AVMON system itself also
includes practical optimizations for our algorithms in order to address high-churn systems.
3.5 Discarded Solutions
Existing availability monitoring overlay schemes in literature today predominantly adopt one of
the following three approaches — self-reporting, centralized, or DHT-based.
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1. Self-reporting relies on a node reporting its own availability, i.e., PS(x) = {x}.
2. A centralized approach uses a central availability monitor, i.e., PS(x) = y0, where y0 is a
specific node or a small fixed subset of nodes.
3. A DHT-based approach uses a P2P DHT [87,92] overlay to decide the monitoring set for a
node, e.g., akin to [13, 19, 99].
Each of the above existing schemes has disadvantages, and none of them satisfies all conditions
(1)-(6) we laid down above. Firstly, self-reporting does not follow randomness and thus allows
nodes to potentially lie about their own availability by reporting arbitrarily high values. Secondly,
central monitoring is neither load-balanced, nor scalable. If a central server were used to monitor,
say 1 Million nodes (say once every 10 seconds, with 10 B forward and 10 B reply payloads), the
server’s bandwidth consumption would be 16 Mbps. This is a high bandwidth since it is dedicated
solely to the monitoring process — additionally, node joins, failures, and departures would need to
be communicated to the server correctly. One could potentially address this by using a cluster of
monitoring servers, however unavailability of the cluster (e.g., due to a network outage) would
cause the availability monitoring service to be unavailable too.
These issues can be addressed using a decentralized approach. A DHT-based approach would
typically decide the PS(x) for a node x based on the position of the hash of x in a DHT ring, by
selecting the neighboring K nodes with id’s around the hashed nodeID of x (i.e., a “replica set”
around a hashed value). Unfortunately, this (and other hash-based approaches) does not satisfy
either Consistency or Randomness, and has problems w.r.t. Verifiability. Consistency may be
violated when there is churn, e.g., a newly born node joining very close to the hashed value of x,
changes x’s monitor set. This could cause frequent transfers of node x’s availability history across
its monitors. Randomness is violated because the condition 3(b) above is not satisfied — two
nodes y, z that are in a PS(x) are likely to hash to nearby points on the ring, and thus are likely
to appear together in other pinging sets as well (of other nodes that hash nearby). Finally,
verifiability could be expensive under node churn — birth of new nodes which hash on the ring in
between a previously verified monitor’s hash and x’s hash will require monitors to be updated.
Such overhead is avoided by consistent monitor selection in our new system called AVMON.
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3.6 Other Related Work
The previous sections discussed existing availability monitoring approaches, and systems that use
such a monitoring service. This section briefly touches on other work that is related to our
approach.
Distributed membership maintenance protocols have been the focus of several researchers. The
goal of these protocols is to have each node maintain a neighbor list, which then defines a
membership graph in the system. SWIM [24] and the gossip-based membership protocol by van
Renesse et al. [98] use probabilistic mechanisms to have each node maintain a complete neighbor
list of all nodes in the system (i.e., a complete membership graph).
Several systems have aimed to build a random membership graph among the nodes of a
distributed system (without attention to consistency or verifiability). The SCAMP membership
system [38] works by having each joining node initiate several joining requests which then undergo
random walks and probabilistic inclusion in the membership lists of recipient nodes. The CYCLON
system [100] works by having each node periodically exchange its neighbor lists with a random
neighbor, and pick a new neighbor list from the union of these lists. T-Man [49] is yet another
membership protocol that is able to support a generic class of membership graph predicates, thus
allowing arbitrary membership graphs (such as random ones) to be formed by local node actions.
Somewhat like SCAMP, AVMON uses a random spanning tree approach to have joining nodes
inform a subset of other nodes of their presence. AVMON also uses a mechanism similar to (but
simpler than) CYCLON to constantly change the neighbor lists of nodes. While the goal of
CYCLON was to have the neighbor lists change to combat system churn, AVMON’s goal is to also
use the neighbor lists to discover monitoring relationships among node pairs. Although AVMON
has a few design decisions similar to some of the above systems (as noted), none of these systems
addresses availability monitoring as a first class problem. While the constructed membership
graphs are random, the conditions of consistency and verifiability are not addressed by these
systems.
Finally, as noted before, the monitoring relationship in AVMON is borrowed from our previous
work [78]. However, AVCAST [78] did not address scalable discovery of monitors (as is the focus of
AVMON). Instead, [78] had each node broadcast (to everyone in the system) whenever it joined
the system — this led to quick discovery, but used a very high message bandwidth. We label this
approach of [78] as Broadcast, and compare it analytically with our new AVMON approaches (see
Table 3.1 in Section 3.8).
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3.7 The AVMON Approach — Overview and Algorithm
This section first gives a brief overview of the AVMON approach, that implements the six goals of
Section 3.4. We then describe individual components of the AVMON algorithms. Recall that our
problem is to select and discover, for each node x, a set of pinging set nodes PS(x) that will
monitor x’s availability. In addition, node x needs to be informed of nodes in its target set TS(x)
(the inverse of PS(.)) that it needs to monitor. Our goal is to satisfy all the properties (1)-(6)
described in Section 3.2.
3.7.1 AVMON Overview
First, AVMON relies on a hash-based (Section 3.7.2) implementation of the monitoring
relationship. This hash-based function can be executed by any node in the system, and determines
if a given arbitrary pair of nodes x, y is related by y ∈ PS(x) (or vice-versa). We chose a
hash-based implementation because it is consistent, verifiable, and random. Second (Section 3.7.3),
in order to discover any consistent and verifiable monitoring relationships (such as the one in
Section 3.7.2), AVMON maintains and uses a coarse overlay. Each node maintains a fixed-size
neighbor list, called the coarse view, that is a random subset of the remaining nodes in the system.
This coarse overlay is used by nodes to discover monitoring relationships between other pairs of
nodes and inform the relevant nodes of such discovery. The protocol for coarse overlay
maintenance and neighbor discovery is scalable, and load-balanced. Finally (Section 3.7.4), the
PS(.) sets are used to monitor other nodes in a scalable manner, with optimizations.
3.7.2 Monitor Selection Scheme — Using Consistent Hashing
This section describes a consistent, verifiable, and random, scheme that AVMON uses in selecting
when a given node x is a monitor for another given node y. We leverage this scheme from our
previous work [78]. Given a unique public node identifier — e.g., < IPaddress, portnumber >, or
a public key, or a static node id — for two nodes x and y, in order to determine if x ∈ PS(y), we
use a consistent one-way hash function H with range normalized to real interval [0, 1] (MD-5 or
SHA-1 [28] could be used), as well as two consistent parameters K and N (see Chapter 2,
item 16). Here, K is a small fixed number (typically a constant)
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Given this, two nodes x, y in AVMON are related as:
y ∈ PS(x)⇔ H(y, x) ≤ K
N
[Hash-consistent Condition] (3.1)
Here, H(y, x) is a normalized hash of the bit string derived by appending the identifier of x after
the identifier of y. Notice that this relation is not necessarily symmetric, since H(x, y) and H(y, x)
are not correlated.
It is evident that: (1) an expected O(K) nodes will be present in PS(x) for any node x; (2)
this relationship is consistent and verifiable at any third node, as well as random.
3.7.3 Monitor Discovery — Composition and Maintenance of the
Coarse View
While the previous section described a specific consistent monitor selection scheme, this section
aims at discovering monitors according to any arbitrary monitor selection scheme, as long as this
scheme is consistent and verifiable. Such a discovery protocol needs to be efficient, scalable, and
load-balanced.
We enable discovery by having each node maintain a coarse view, a random subset of other
nodes in the system. This coarse view is used to discover monitors for other nodes. Although the
discovery protocol described below is generic, for concreteness we will assume the hash-based
monitor selection from Section 3.7.2.
Each node x maintains a set of neighbors in its coarse view, denoted as CV (x). The size of
each node’s coarse view is limited to a maximal cvs entries. In order to maintain randomness of
the coarse view at each node, we describe two sub-protocols below: (1) the joining sub-protocol
executed for nodes entering (or re-entering) the system, and (2) the coarse view maintenance and
monitor discovery sub-protocol.
3.7.3.1 Joining Sub-Protocol
Figure 3.1 describes the join sub-protocol. Node x initiates this protocol whenever it either joins
the system freshly (i.e., after being born), or rejoins it. The goal of this protocol is to inform a set
of other nodes (expected number of cvs) about node x, at any point of time. The protocol works
by having x create a JOIN message, specifying its own id (x), and an integer weight (values of
which are detailed in the next paragraph). This JOIN message is sent to a random node to start
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with (provided either by the system’s introducer node, or from the old CV (x) if x is rejoining).
When a node y receives such a JOIN message with a non-zero weight c, it first checks if x is
already present in CV (y), or if |CV (y)| = cvs. If neither is true, y includes x in its CV , and
decrements the weight value c of the JOIN. In any case, y finally forwards two JOIN messages
with weights set to (⌊ c2⌋) and (⌈ c2⌉) respectively, each to a random node from its CV (y). This
ensures that JOIN message weights are conserved.
The goal of this protocol is to have an expected cvs other nodes include given node x in their
coarse views, by creating a random spanning graph with the requisite number of internal and leaf
nodes. Thus, the initial weight assigned to the JOIN message by a freshly joining node (being
born) is merely cvs. On the other hand, for a node x that is rejoining the system, this weight is set
to the minimum of cvs, and the time elapsed since the last departure of node x from the system
(time in “protocol periods”, term defined in the next paragraph). This is because, once node x
leaves the system, the protocol described next (in Figure 3.2) ensures that the average rate at
which nodes delete x from their own coarse view is 1 per protocol period. Section 3.8 analyzes the
join sub-protocol in detail, showing that it is unlikely for any given node to receive multiple such
JOIN messages, and that the spread time of the JOIN information is O(log(cvs)) w.h.p. (with
high probability).
3.7.3.2 Coarse View Maintenance and Discovery Sub-Protocol
Figure 3.2 shows the pseudocode for maintaining the coarse view and for discovering monitoring
relationships. The maintenance protocol described in the figure is executed at each node once
every Tcv =coarse view protocol period (also known as a “round”) — protocol period durations are
fixed at nodes, but are executed asynchronously across nodes. The sub-protocol at node x has
three tasks: to eliminate from CV (x) nodes that have left the system (and may or may not rejoin),
to shuﬄe CV (x) with new entries (to keep it random), while discovering monitoring relationships
in the process.
The detailed protocol operations are as follows. Once during each protocol period, node x
picks a single node z uniformly at random from its CV (x), and pings it — an unresponsive node is
removed from the CV . Notice that this pinging is different from the pinging involved in
availability monitoring, which we will discuss in Section 3.7.4. Observe that this implies that a
dead node z (i.e., one that has left for good) will eventually be deleted from all coarse views that
contained z (Theorem 3.8.2).
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For node x to (re-)join the system:
Pick a random node y;
if (this is the first join of this node)
Send y a JOIN(x, cvs) message (with an integer weight
of cvs);
else
let tdown =
time since node’s latest leave from system
protocol period duration
Send y a JOIN(x,min(cvs, tdown));
Inherit view from this random node;
Participate in the Coarse Membership Protocol (Figure 2);
Each node y receiving a JOIN(x, c) message:
if(c ≤ 0)
discard JOIN message; return;
if (x is not already present in CV (y))
add x to CV (y);
c := c− 1;
Create two messages JOIN(x, ⌊ c2⌋) and JOIN(x, ⌈ c2⌉);
Send each of these messages to a randomly selected node from
CV (y);
Figure 3.1: Joining (and Rejoining) Sub-Protocol for Nodes.
At Node x: Periodically (once every protocol period)
Pick a random node z from CV (x) and ping it;
If (z does not respond)
Remove z from CV (x);
Pick a random alive node w from CV (x);
Fetch CV (w) from w;
Check all (u, v) pairs (u 6= v) in
({CV (x) ∪ {x}} × {CV (w) ∪ {x,w}})∪
({CV (w) ∪ {x,w}} × {CV (x) ∪ {x}})
for the hash-consistent condition H(u, v) ≤ KN ;
for (each pair (u, v) discovered to satisfy the above
hash-consistent condition)
Inform both nodes u and v of the match by sending a
NOTIFY(u, v) message;
CV (x) := Subset of cvs random entries from CV (x) ∪CV (w);
Figure 3.2: Coarse Membership and Monitor Discovery Sub-Protocol.
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Since an expected cvs nodes know about any given node z, and the probability of any of these
nodes picking z to ping is 1cvs per protocol period, the expected number of nodes that delete a
non-alive node z from their coarse view is cvs · 1cvs = 1 per protocol period. Recall that this
motivated the weights assigned to JOIN messages in Figure 3.1.
During each protocol period, node x also picks a random and alive node w ∈ CV (x), and
fetches its coarse view CV (w). It checks the hash-consistent condition (Section 3.7.2) among all
pairs of nodes (u, v) and (v, u), where u ∈ CV (x) ∪ {x}, v ∈ CV (w) ∪ {x,w}, and u 6= v. Any node
pair (u, v) discovered to satisfy the hash-consistent condition are informed via a NOTIFY message
sent to both. Finally, to maintain randomness of coarse views, node x selects a new coarse view
CV (x) by selecting cvs elements at random from the set CV (x) ∪ CV (w). Observe that the above
protocol implies that at any time at node x, the hash-consistent condition for all pairs within
CV (x) have already been checked.
The average number of coarse view entries pointing to a node x stays stable because an entry
at some other node y’s coarse view, pointing to node x, is equally likely to be either: (1) thrown
away when y fetches someone else’s coarse view, as it is to be (2) replicated at another node z that
fetches y’s coarse view (containing entry x). Section 3.8 will show that (1) if a node and its
potential monitor both stay alive for long enough, they will eventually discover each other
(Theorem 3.8.1); (2) the expected discovery time is small for reasonably small values of cvs.
3.7.4 Using the Monitoring Overlay
This section briefly discusses how the monitoring overlay is used to track availability, how nodes
report their monitors, and an important optimization. Each node x maintains both two lists of
node identifiers: PS(x) and TS(x). Whenever a NOTIFY(u, x) message is received at node x, if
node u is not already present in PS(x), the hash-consistent condition H(u, x) ≤ KN is re-checked
and if true, node u is included in PS(x) (i.e., node x will be monitored by node u from now on).
Similarly, on receipt of a NOTIFY(x, u) message at node x, the hash-consistent condition is
checked and if true, node u is included in TS(x) (i.e., node x will monitor u’s availability from now
on). This checking avoids the addition of new TS() or PS() entries if spurious NOTIFY messages
are sent by selfish nodes that attempt to recruit invalid monitors.
Each node x periodically sends monitoring pings to each of the nodes in TS(x), and records
this information in its persistent storage. Please note that monitoring pings are different from the
pings in the protocol of Figure 3.1. Monitoring pings are sent out periodically, once every
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TM =monitoring period. The monitoring period value may be different from the coarse view
protocol period of Figure 3.2. As noted in Section 3.2, the granularity in which measured
availability information about TS(x) nodes is stored at x can be arbitrary, i.e., stored availability
information could either be raw, aged, or recent, etc.
Whenever a node y wants to discover a given node x’s pinging set nodes, it is the burden of
node x to report to node y at least the requested number of its monitoring nodes. For instance,
node y’s policy may be to require x to report at least l (≤ K) monitoring nodes. Node x can then
select any l of its PS(x) nodes to report to y, but cannot lie about these, since y can check the
hash-consistent condition for each reported monitor. Node y can then ask each reported monitor
individually for x’s availability history. Section 3.8.3 analyzes how large K needs to be to support
such an “l out of K” policy.
3.7.5 Optimization — Forgetful Pinging
As nodes die in the distributed system, TS(x) and PS(x) may become filled with garbage nodes
that are actually dead. Since deaths are silent, there is no way of knowing whether an
unresponsive node will rejoin or not, thus these garbage elements cannot be deleted. Instead, we
propose here an optimization to reduce the rate of monitoring pings sent to these unresponsive
nodes, in order to reduce the bandwidth consumption due to dead nodes but without affecting the
precision of availability measurement.
The optimization works as follows at node x — if a node u in TS(x) has been unresponsive for
time t, and t > τ , where τ is a time-threshold, and ts(u) was the last time instance that node u
was pinged successfully by node x, then pick u to ping with probability c·ts(u)ts(u)+t , per monitoring
protocol period. This is motivated by the need to ping u less frequently if it has been away for
long (denominator), but also to send it at least c2 pings per monitoring period, from each monitor,
for up to ts(u) time units after it went oﬄine (numerator). Section 6.1 evaluates this optimization.
3.8 Analysis: AVMON Performance and Optimal Variants
We first analyze in Section 3.8.1 the performance of the joining and coarse view maintenance
protocols (from Section 3.7.3), then Section 3.8.2 studies different optimal variants of AVMON
discovery. Section 3.8.3 discusses values for K and the effect of colluding nodes.
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3.8.1 Basic Analysis
As a precursor to our optimality discussion, this section first analyzes the join protocol and its
dissemination time (Figure 3.1). Then, we derive the discovery time, as well as overheads of
memory, message, and computation, for the AVMON protocol (Figure 3.2). We will assume that
cvs = o(
√
N) in all of the discussion below.
3.8.1.1 Coarse View Analysis — Spread and Dissemination Time of JOIN information
Since the weight of the very first JOIN(x,w) message from a freshly born node x is set to cvs, no
more than cvs nodes can add x to their coarse views right after x’s birth. In addition, when the
node rejoins, it sets the initial weight to make up for the lost number of entries pointing to it
(Figure 3.1), thus keeping the expected number of coarse views pointing to x, at cvs (see
Section 3.7.3).
We analyze the expected dissemination time of a newly born node x’s first JOIN message.
This upper bound also holds for JOINs sent by rejoining nodes. Notice that the spread of
JOIN(x, .) messages, via the random coarse view graph, basically builds a random spanning tree
with cvs total nodes (internal + leaf nodes). This gives a spread time of O(log(cvs)) time for the
JOIN information, unless a large number of nodes receive duplicate JOIN(x,.) messages. In fact,
this “unless” clause is improbable — the probability of a given node receiving a JOIN(x, .)
message in a given round with m forwarding nodes is = 1− (1− 2N )m ≤ 1− (1− 2N )cvs ≃ 2·cvsN ,
since cvs = o(
√
N). Thus, the expected number of duplicate JOIN-receiving nodes, per protocol
period, is bounded from above by cvs · 2·cvsN = o(1). In addition, the probability that none of the
cvs nodes receive duplicate JOIN messages is =(1− 2N )cvs ≃ (1− 2·cvsN ), which → 1 as N →∞.
Thus, with high probability, the JOIN(x, .) spreads quickly to the requisite nodes in time that
is O(log(cvs)). In the worst case, this time is O(log(N)).
3.8.1.2 Discovery time of the Hash-Consistent Condition for a node pair (D)
Firstly, we have the following theorem for eventual discovery of monitors:
Theorem 3.8.1. If (x, y) satisfy the hash-consistent condition, and if nodes x, y stay alive for
long enough in the system, then x will eventually discover y, i.e., y ∈ TS(x) eventually.
This is true because of AVMON’s continuous exchange and shuﬄing of coarse views. Node y
will see node x an infinite number of times in its coarse view, and thus node y is guaranteed to
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eventually pick x to exchange coarse views with (Figure 3.2), during which y will check for the
hash-consistent condition with x.
Secondly, we show that discovery is in fact fast. We do so by bounding from above the
expected discovery time, where we are interested only in an asymptotic bound. Given a pair of
nodes x, y, the discovery of the monitoring relationship between x and y occurs at the first
instance when some node (not necessarily either x or y) checks for the hash-consistent condition
with the pairs (x, y) and (y, x). Based on the protocol of Figure 3.2, this check happens only
during the coarse view fetches. Given a node u that fetches the coarse view of another node w, the
probability that x will be present in CV (u) and that y will be present in CV (w), is
=
(
cvs
N · cvsN
)
= cvs
2
N2 (we ignore the residual probability of y ∈ CV (u) and x ∈ CV (w), since we are
interested only in asymptotic bounds). Thus, the probability that the (x, y) pair is not checked by
this particular coarse view fetch is ≤
(
1− cvs2N2
)
. Now, notice that per protocol period, there are a
total of N such coarse view fetches. Putting all this together, we can derive the probability of the
pair (x, y) being checked by at least one of the fetches in one protocol period as:
Pr [Checked(x, y)] ≥ 1−
(
1− cvs
2
N2
)N
≥ 1−

(1− cvs2
N2
) N2
cvs2


cvs2
N
≥ 1− e−cvs
2
N
In the last inequality, we have used the following inequality: for large M ,
(
1− 1M
)M ≤ e−1.
Thus, the expected time to discovery of the monitoring relationship for an arbitrary node pair
(x, y) can be bounded as (in number of protocol periods):
E[D] =
1
Pr[Checked(x, y)]
≤ 1
1− e−cvs2N
Notice that with cvs = o(
√
N) and N →∞, the exponential series expansion can be used to
simplify this as: E[D]upper bound ≃ Ncvs2 .
In reality, when a node x joins and leaves continuously, the real physical discovery time of a
valid given monitor y of it will be higher than E[D]. Specifically, the discover protocol of AVMON
is a memoryless process. Thus, for a node with a periodic pattern of u uptime seconds followed by
d downtime seconds, the actual discovery time of any given monitor of it is = E[D] · uu+d .
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3.8.1.3 Effect of Dead Nodes
From the first three lines of Figure 3.2, we have:
Theorem 3.8.2. A dead node z (i.e., one that has left for good) will eventually be deleted from all
coarse views that contained z.
In addition, a node x with dead node z ∈ CV (x), will delete z w.h.p. (1− 1N ) within
T ∗cv = (cvs · log(N)) protocol periods. This is because the probability of deletion of z from CV (x)
in Tcv rounds is = 1− (1− 1cvs)Tcv ≃ (1− 1N ) for Tcv = T ∗cv.
Also, we pointed out previously that the death of nodes from the system may cause TS(x) to
contain garbage entries. This is unavoidable since deaths are silent. However, if Nlongterm is the
number of nodes that has been born in the system recently, then the expected size of TS(x) is
K ·Nlongterm/N . For minimal-death PlanetLab-like Grid systems, N can be chosen to be the
maximal number of machines, thus E[|TS(x)|] ≤ K. For P2P systems, if Nlongterm is within a
constant factor of N , E[|TS(x)|] is still bounded. Further, our forgetful pinging optimization
(Section 3.7.4) keeps the bandwidth effect of garbage entries referring to dead nodes, very low.
Experiments in Section 6.1 elaborate on the benefits of forgetful pinging.
3.8.1.4 Memory, Message Overhead (M)
The per-node x memory is (|CV (x)|+ |PS(x)|+ |TS(x)|), or O(cvs+ 2K) = O(cvs), since
typically K < cvs. The message overhead at each node, is O(cvs) bytes per protocol period for
coarse view maintenance, and an additional O(K) per monitoring protocol period. The first of
these terms dominates, but stays small. For instance, with cvs = O( 4
√
N) (Optimal-MDC — see
Section 3.8.2 below) at N = 1 Million (thus, cvs = 32), protocol period = monitoring period = 1
second, and 8 Bytes per entry, the per-node bandwidth is 256Bps, which is reasonably small.
3.8.1.5 Computational Overhead (C)
This is O(cvs2) per protocol period per node, and arises from the hash-consistency checking in the
coarse view fetches. For N = 1 Million, cvs = 4
√
N (Optimal-MDC — see Section 3.8.2 below), this
turns out to be 1000 hash computations per protocol period. However, this is quite fast — [5]
shows that, with the C++ implementation of MD-5 hash running on a 2.1 GHz P4, WinXP SP 1
machine, 1000 hash computations (each with 12 B) take about 0.375 ms. This is reasonably small,
e.g., protocol period = 10 s implies that hashing consumes 0.003% CPU time.
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3.8.2 Optimal Variants of AVMON
From the analysis in the previous section, the size of the coarse view (cvs) determines a tradeoff
between memory, communication bandwidth, and computation on the one hand, and discovery
time on the other hand. However, an application may be interested in optimizing only some of
these metrics, and not others. For instance, if AVMON is run within the hosts of an in-house PC
cluster connected over a high bandwidth LAN, we may be interested in minimizing only the
computation (C) and discovery time (D), but not the bandwidth or memory. Alternatively,
AVMON being run in a PlanetLab-like cluster with multicore machines may not care about
computation, but would like to optimize discovery time (D), and memory and bandwidth (M). Of
course, there are applications that would like to optimize all of M,D,C.
Below, we mathematically derive the values of cvs for each of these three optimal variants
(MD, MDC and DC), and then discuss the practicality of these optimal variants (notice that
optimizing MC does not make sense since both M and C increase with cvs).
3.8.2.1 Optimality Analysis 1 — Optimal-MD
We would like to minimize both memory utilization and message bandwidth (M) at each node (cvs
units), as well as the discovery time (D) which is E[D] = 1
1−e
−cvs2
N
. Thus, we want to minimize the
additive function:
f(cvs) = cvs+
1
1− e−cvs2N
≃ cvs+ N
cvs2
Although the units of M and D are different, we use an additive function because we are interested
in minimizing both. Using a constant multiplicative factor with one of the terms, would yield the
same asymptotic result as below. Differentiating f w.r.t. cvs gives us:
d(f(cvs))
d(cvs)
=
(
1− 2 ·N
cvs3
)
= 0⇒ cvsOptimal−MD = 3
√
2N
At this optimum, d(f(cvs))
2
d2(cvs) =
6·N
cvs4 > 0, thus implying it is a minimum of f . This is the
optimal cvs value to minimize memory, bandwidth, and discovery time. The optimal values of
memory, M and D are each O( 3
√
N) (different units in each case).
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Table 3.1: AVMON Variants: Performance of different algorithms for availability monitoring
(cvs=Coarse View Size).
Approach Memory, B/W per
Round (M)
Expected Discov-
ery Time (D)
Computations per
Round (C)
Broadcast (from [78]) O(N) O(log(N)) (One-Time only)
AVMON, Generic cvs O(cvs)
(
1− e−cvs
2
N
)−1
O
(
cvs2
)
AVMON, cvs = log(N) O(log(N)) N(log(N))2 O
(
(log(N))2
)
(Optimal-MD) AVMON,
cvs = 3
√
N
O
(
3
√
N
)
3
√
N O
(
(N)
2/3
)
(Optimal-MDC,-DC)
AVMON, cvs = 4
√
N
O
(
4
√
N
) √
N O
(√
N
)
3.8.2.2 Optimality Analysis 2 — Optimal-MDC
We would like to minimize both memory utilization and message bandwidth (M) at each node
(cvs units), the discovery time (D): E[D] = 1
1−e
−cvs2
N
, as well as the computational overhead (C).
Thus, we want to minimize the function:
g(cvs) = cvs+ cvs2 +
1
1− e−cvs2N
≃ cvs+ cvs2 + N
cvs2
Differentiating g w.r.t. cvs gives us:
d(g(cvs))
d(cvs)
=
(
1 + 2cvs− 2 ·N
cvs3
)
= 0
⇒ cvsOptimal−MDC ≃ 4
√
N
Notice that d(g(cvs))
2
d2(cvs) = 2 +
6·N
cvs4 > 0 at this optimum, thus implying it is a minimum of g.
This gives a memory and per-round bandwidth of O( 4
√
N) each, an expected discovery time of
√
N , and a computational overhead of O(
√
N) (with different units in each case).
3.8.2.3 Optimality Analysis 3 — Optimal-DC
To minimize the discovery time (D) and computation complexity (C), the reader will notice that
the optimizing function can be derived in a manner similar to the function g in the Optimal-MDC
analysis above, and gives an optimal cvsOptimal−DC =
4
√
N .
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Table 3.1 summarizes the results of our optimality analysis, and also compares the benefits of
the AVMON approach to the na¨ıve Broadcast-based discovery algorithm of [78].
3.8.2.4 In practice — Optimal-MDC AVMON (cvs = 4
√
N)
As mentioned previously, for N = 1 Million, cvs = 4
√
N = 32, and K = log2(N) = 20, the size of
CV (x) is 192B, and the bandwidth is 192B per protocol period. The expected discovery time is
1000 time units, however a given node x discovers one new pinging set node on average at least
every 50 protocol periods. The computational overhead due to hash calculation is also low.
Finally, the probability of partitioning in the coarse view graph is very low — [52] shows that this
probability will be close to zero if cvs = Ω(log(N)), which is true in all the optimal variants above.
3.8.3 Continuous Monitoring and Resilience to Collusion
We now analyze how large K (size of PS()) should be to ensure continuous monitoring of all
nodes. We also derive bounds on pinging set size, and analyze the effect of colluders.
3.8.3.1 Choosing K
The value of K should be chosen so that every given node is continuously monitored w.h.p. This
requires that for every node x in the system, we have that: (a) at least one node present in PS(x)
is up w.h.p. at a given point of time, and (b) |PS(x)| ≥ l(= O(1)) w.h.p.. Condition (b) is
essential in order to support “l out of K” policies described in Section 3.7.4. We show below that
both conditions (a) and (b) can be satisfied w.h.p. by setting
K ≥ log(N) ·max
(
2 · log( 11−a ), (l + 1)
)
, where a is the system-wide average node availability.
Firstly, for condition (a), the probability that for node x with |PS(x)| = K, at least one
PS(x) node is up at a given point of time is Pr[|{PS(x)}alive| > 0] =
(
1− (1− a)K). If
K = c · log(N), then Pr[|{PS(x)}alive| > 0] = 1−N
− c
log( 11−a ) . Choosing c such that c
log( 11−a )
≥ 2,
we calculate the probability that every node’s PS(.) has at least one node alive, as follows:
Pr [∀x : |{PS(x)}alive| > 0] =
(
1−N
− c
log( 11−a )
)N
≥
(
1−N
− c
log( 11−a )
+1
)
≥
(
1− 1
N
)
→ 1 as N →∞.
Secondly for the condition (b) above, i.e., for |PS(x)| ≥ l to be true w.h.p. for a constant l, we
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show that K ≥ (l + 2) · log(N) suffices. This derivation comes about because at
K = (l + 2) · log(N), the probability of a node x having fewer than l nodes in its PS(x) is:
=
l−1∑
i=1
(
N
i
)
·
(
1− K
N
)(N−i)
·
(
K
N
)i
≤
[(
1− K
N
)N−l+1
·
l−1∑
i=1
(
N
i
)]
=
[(
1− K
N
)N−l+1
· l ·O(N (l−1))
]
≤
[
e−K·(1−
l−1
N ) · l ·O(N (l−1))
]
= O
(
1
N2
)
Thus the probability that every one of the N nodes in the system will have its |PS(.)| ≥ l is:
=
(
1−O
(
1
N2
))N
≃ 1−O
(
1
N
)
, → 1 as N →∞.
Finally, Balls and Bins analysis ( [82], Theorem 1) says that throwing O(N · log(N)) balls into
N bins ensures that w.h.p., the maximum number of balls in any bin is O(log(N)). With
O(K) = O(log(N)) monitoring relationships per node in AVMON, we can conclude that the
maximal size of any node’s TS(.) (and thus PS(.)) set is O(log(N)) w.h.p.
3.8.3.2 Resilience to Collusion
The AVMON system avoids nodes misreporting their own availability, but there is the possibility
that a node may be able to recruit colluders to misreport its availability.
First, suppose each node x in the system has C
(
= o
(
N
log(N)
))
colluding nodes, i.e., nodes
willing to misrepresent x’s availability as a value higher than the real value (or as 100%). Given
K = O(log(N)), the probability that no colluders of given node x appear in its PS(x) is:
=
(
1− K
N
)C
≃
(
1− CK
N
)
→ 1 as N →∞.
Thus, it is probabilistically impossible for a node to have its PS(.) set polluted by any colluders.
Second, we analyze the system-wide collusion resilience. If there are D such colluding
relationships system-wide (across any colludee-colluder node pair) and
D = o
(
N
log(N)
)
,K = O(log(N)), then the probability that none of these pairs are valid monitors
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is:
=
(
1− K
N
)D
≃
(
1− DK
N
)
→ 1 as N →∞.
Thus, none of the colluders will have any effect on the system, w.h.p. The reader may notice
the caveat with this result — the fraction of colluders tolerated (o
(
1
log(N)
)
) decreases with N .
However, the number of colluders tolerated (o
(
N
log(N)
)
) itself grows with N , thus AVMON is able
to withstand larger and larger colluding groups as the system size increases.
3.8.3.3 Resilience to Collusion Under Insecure Identifier
We say that a node’s unique public identifier is secure if it has been assigned and signed by a
trusted third party outside of the system, or if it has been assigned by a trusted introducer node in
a way similar to [91]’s secure bootstraping. On the other hand, if the public identifier is chosen by
the node itself, it may not be secure — if a node y can choose its identifier, y could potentially
lookup an identifier that would let it become a valid member of a particular node’s PS(x), thus
opening the door to bias x’s reported availability by y’s influence.
Consider the following potentially insecure identifier: < IPaddress, portnumber >, where we
assume that the port number can be chosen by the node before it joins the AVMON overlay —
otherwise, if a system-wide pre-determined port number is used, this identifier would not be
insecure. With such an identifier, a set of colluder nodes could include themselves into a single
node’s pinging set in the following way: Recall that the probability of being a valid member of
PS(x) is K/N , thus a colluder targeting x would have to change its port number N/K times, on
expectation, before it finds an identifier that would make the node a valid member of PS(x) —
e.g., with N = 10, 000 and K = ⌈log2(N)⌉ = 14, the colluder y would attempt, on expectation, 715
different port numbers to be a valid member of PS(x); in other words, there are K/N · 65535 = 91
port numbers that will let y ∈ PS(x).
We can generalize the chances that this attack has to achieve I simultaneous valid PS(.)
insertions. The expected number of ports that will include a colluding node y in I different PS(.)’s
is 65535 · (KN )I ; in other words, to find a public id that will let y be a valid member of I PS(.)’s, y
would have to change its port number
(
N
K
)I
times on expectation. Following the previous
example, N = 10, 000 and K = 14, if the set of colluders want to be valid members of both PS(x)
and PS(z) — i.e., I = 2 — then the expected number of port numbers allowing valid insertions is
( 1410000 )
2 · 65535≪ 1, therefore the attack will fail w.h.p. In conclusion, if ids · (KN )I = o(1), where
ids is the number of distinct identifiers a node y can choose, then w.h.p. y cannot simultaneously
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insert itself into I PS(.)’s.
In summary, if a group of colluders inflating the availability of a single target node can be
problematic to the system, then secure identifiers should be used.
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Chapter 4
Availability-aware Membership
4.1 Motivation
We would like to provide system administrators and distributed applications, in large-scale
distributed systems, with monitoring and management operations that query nodes based on their
availability. The queries could be done on-demand or continuously. Such operations can be
extremely useful in a variety of large-scale distributed systems. In particular, consider the
following availability-aware management operations:
I Threshold-multicast and Threshold-anycast: Multicast (or anycast) to all nodes with
availability > a, where a ∈ [0, 1), starting from any arbitrary initiator node. This would be
useful for both control and data operations. Control operations include selecting a supernode
in a P2P system with a minimal threshold availability, e.g., akin to [59, 61, 67]. Data
operations include a publish-subscribe or multicast application where packets are sent out to
only nodes above a certain availability, e.g., [78]. Such a multicast application would
incentivize hosts to have higher availability, in order to obtain good reliability.
II Range-multicast and Range-anycast: Multicast (or anycast) to a node with availability
in range [b, b+ δ] ⊆ [0, 1], starting from any arbitrary initiator node. This operation can be
used to fingerprint characteristics of the nodes within an availability range, e.g., one could
find out the average bandwidth of nodes below a certain availability, in order to understand
the correlations. In addition, threshold anycast would be useful for selection of replica
locations for a file [13, 19], and of deployment instances for a distributed Grid application [14].
There are many other availability-based management operations not listed above that may be
desired by applications. However, we find that all of the existing overlays in literature are
availability-agnostic while selecting neighbors, thus making it inefficient to run the above classes of
tasks. This observation motivates the need for an availability-aware overlay, that would support
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availability-based management operations like the ones listed above.
4.2 Problem Statement
A decentralized solution to the availability-aware management problems just described consists of
two components: (I) an overlay among the nodes that helps each node maintain a set of neighbors
(or a membership list), based on the availabilities of these nodes; and (II) operations to execute the
desired management operations by leveraging this overlay. Furthermore, these components require
an availability monitoring service, which can be queried to learn the availability of any node in the
system — for this we use AVMON as presented in Chapter 3.
In building the overlay (component (I) above), we face two challenges. The first arises because
we consider a system model where nodes may be selfish and colluding (see Chapter 2 and
Section 4.3). To address this challenge, we select neighbors of a given node x, based on the
availabilities of the nodes, in a manner that is consistent in spite of changes in the system.
Concretely, given a node x and y, let M(x, y) be a binary variable that denotes whether y is a
valid entry in x’s membership list or not. The global rules for deciding the value of M(x, y) is
called the global predicate. Consistency requires that the value of M(x, y) depend only on the
public identifier (e.g., public key or IP and port) of x, y, and their availabilities av(x), av(y) as
reported by the availability monitoring service. M(x, y) should not be influenced by any external
factors such as other nodes in the system, the system size, or churn in the system (i.e., nodes
joining and leaving the system), etc. Notice that consistency allows both the recipient node y of
any message and a third node to verify the value of M(x, y), regardless of other factors in the
system. This implies that any node x (selfish or otherwise) will be able to send messages only to
other nodes y that are legitimately its neighbors under the consistent predicate, i.e., for which
M(x, y) = 1.
The second challenge arises from the fact that we would like to maintain connectivity in the
overlay as well as support efficient anycast and multicast operations, yet maintain only a small
number of neighbors. A small number of neighbors translates to a lower bandwidth, memory, and
computation overhead. In order to ensure connectivity, scalability, and efficiency, we require the
neighbor selection criteria to be flexible, besides being consistent. Our approach addresses this
challenge by coupling consistency with randomization.
Finally, for component (II) above, we would like to execute anycast and multicast operations
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in a manner that is fast (i.e., has low latency), scalable (i.e., uses a small number of messages), and
reliable (i.e., manages to complete successfully). We address this challenge by using a variety of
techniques, ranging from flooding and greedy approaches, to gossip and simulated annealing.
4.3 Assumptions and System Model
Besides what was described in Chapter 2 for selfish and colluding behavior, for the membership
problem we consider the following: Nodes (especially those with low availabilities) would like to
have as many other nodes (possibly of high availability) in their own membership list, and to
communicate with them. Further, these selfish nodes may wish to flood the network with copies of
a genuine anycast or multicast request they received. Note that corruption of messages is not
considered here, as it is an orthogonal problem, and how to tolerate it has been previously
addressed [68].
Similar to knowledge of N (Chapter 2, item 16), we assume wide knowledge of the availability
variation probability density function (PDF). In several deployed P2P systems, the availability
PDF has been observed to remain fairly stable from one day to another [94].
Finally, we assume the presence of an availability monitoring service resilient to selfish and
colluding nodes — AVMON (Chapter 3).
4.4 Solution
We present AVMEM which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first proposed availability-aware
membership protocol. AVMEM explicitly leverages availability information of nodes in the system
while selecting neighbors. AVMEM avoids the effects of selfish nodes, and allows efficient
execution of our targeted availability-based management operations. Concretely, each node in
AVMEM maintains two small membership lists: a horizontal sliver (HS) and a vertical sliver
(V S). The horizontal sliver at node x contains a small (random) subset of nodes with availability
“close” to av(x), the availability of x. In contrast the vertical sliver contains a small (random)
subset of nodes from among those with availability that is not in the vicinity of av(x). This is
illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Most importantly, AVMEM supports an arbitrary class of membership predicates that are
random and consistent. This gives an application developer the choice from a family of AVMEM
predicates in order to build the appropriate overlay for their application. The horizontal and
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Figure 4.1: AVMEM membership lists at a node x: Horizontal Sliver and Vertical Sliver.
vertical slivers at each node are selected in a randomized and consistent fashion by using the
application-specified predicate. This maintains connectivity, reduces the effect of selfish nodes, and
provides efficiency, scale and reliability for the management operations. For instance, an
application that wishes to build a uniformly random graph would be able to specify this as an
AVMEM predicate. A different application that is likely to have queries sent to only nodes with
availabilities that are near that of the initiating node may prefer to use an AVMEM predicate that
prefers neighbors that are closer-by in the availability space. If one knows the availability
distribution (i.e., PDF or CDF) of the system in question, one could design AVMEM predicates
that have interesting properties, e.g., uniform density of neighbors from any availability range.
We discuss and analyze the family of predicates supported by AVMEM in Section 4.6. Then,
in Section 4.7, we present decentralized AVMEM protocols that achieve scalable and fast discovery
as well as updating of neighbors at each node. Finally, we solve: (1) anycast by using greedy and
simulated-annealing approaches, and (2) multicast by using either a flooding or a gossip-based
approach. We have implemented AVMEM, and we present trace-based simulations in Section 6.2.
Specifically, we use churn traces from the Overnet P2P system [12] to evaluate and compare the
effectiveness the management operations, as well as to microbenchmark the behavior of the
AVMEM overlay itself. Due to the novelty of AVMEM, we prefer to do a thorough and
comprehensive evaluation, rather than creating a strawman system to make comparisons.
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4.5 Discarded Solutions and Other Related Work
Using a centralized solution to execute the management tasks mentioned is prohibitive because
this would limit the number of simultaneous tasks that can be addressed, especially if these tasks
are for the multicast variants above. It is well-known that such central-database solutions are
rather ineffective at providing real-time answers to instantaneous queries.
In the realm of decentralized solutions, one potential alternative is to leverage P2P ring-based
distributed hash tables (DHTs) such as Pastry [87] or Chord [92]. Such an approach would decide
DHT nodeIDs for nodes based on the node’s availability, rather than a hash of its IP address.
Although this allows management tasks to be resolved via the DHT routing algorithm itself, this
approach causes an unacceptable amount of churn in the DHTs. This churn arises since a nodeID
changes with the node’s availability, besides the fact that nodes are continuously going oﬄine and
coming online. In addition, when using ring-based DHT routing the latency for answering a
range-multicast task is linear in the number of nodes involved, thus making it inefficient.
Another alternative could be P2P solutions that are specially built to support range searches
(or range queries) such as skip trees, graphs and others [10,45, 90, 108], or content-based
publish-subscribe architectures like Sub-2-Sub [101]. In this approach, nodes would be organized
and placed in the overlay based on their current availability, so that anycast and multicast tasks
could be executed by doing a range search on the appropriate availability range. Once again
however, there is a high degree of churn in the system; as nodes’ availabilities change over time,
their positions in the overlay will move around as well. Further, P2P range query structures are
known to be difficult to manipulate under concurrent operations. Note that no system targets
range or threshold operations under a selfish node model.
Finally, we would like to eliminate broadcast-based solutions that flood out the multicast or
anycast to all nodes, since this is inefficient, unscalable, and causes spam to nodes outside the
target range.
4.6 AVMEM Membership Graph Predicates
This section presents a range of predicates for creating random and consistent membership graphs
(or overlays) that are availability-aware. Section 4.7 will describe the discovery of membership
graphs for any such given predicate.
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Basics and Notation: The availability of a node x, as reported by the availability monitoring
service, is denoted as av(x). Further, the identifier (hash-based or IP-port) of node x is denoted as
id(x). Given two nodes x and y and a membership predicate, M(x, y) is a binary variable that
indicates whether node x (with availability av(x)) should contain node y (with availability av(y))
in its membership list or not.
Due to our principles of randomization and consistency, we use the following framework for
the AVMEM predicate:
M(x, y) =


0 if H(id(x), id(y)) > f (av(x), av(y))
1 if H(id(x), id(y)) ≤ f (av(x), av(y))
(4.1)
Here, H(.) is a (consistent) normalized cryptographic hash function with range [0, 1], used for
its randomization — a normalized version of SHA-1 or MD-5 could be used for this purpose.
Further, f() is a function that takes as input a pair of variables in the range [0, 1], and outputs a
value that lies in [0, 1].
The above predicate means that for given nodes x, y, node x will include y in its membership
list only if the value of H(id(x), id(y)) is less than the value of f(av(x), av(y)). This, and the fact
that H() and f() are globally known, provides consistency since the value of M(x, y), as specified
by equation 4.1, depends only on the identifiers and availabilities of nodes x and y, but not on
anything else in the system. Further, regardless of who evaluates the condition 4.1 above, it will
produce the same result for nodes x, y.
Since we assume that H is a fixed and well-known function, the actual AVMEM predicate is
thus determined by the nature of f . For instance, if f(., .) = p, (p ∈ [0, 1]), then we derive a
random overlay (like SCAMP [36] or CYCLON [100]), but with the additional property of
consistency. In other words, for this example, given two nodes x and y, then M(x, y) = 1
consistently with probability p.
Section 4.6.1 next discusses a family of interesting AVMEM predicates specified under the
framework of equation (4.1). Section 4.6.4 analyzes these predicates.
4.6.1 A Family of Availability-aware AVMEM Predicates
We consider a family of interesting predicates that leverage the known probability distribution
function (PDF) of the availability variation in a given system. Notice that such information can be
collected and analyzed oﬄine by either a crawler or a central server. This information can then be
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communicated to all nodes at pre-run-time and used consistently. Suppose the PDF of the
availability distribution of the system is specified as p : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], i.e., p(a) · da is the fraction of
nodes with availability between a and (a− da), when da→ 0. Then, our canonical AVMEM
predicate is specified as:
f(av(x), av(y)) =


hs(av(x), av(y), p(.)) if |av(x) − av(y)| < ǫ. [Hor. Sliver]
vs(av(x), av(y), p(.)) otherwise. [Vertical Sliver]
Recall that a horizontal sliver at node x is defined as a partial list of nodes (called horizontal
sliver neighbors of x in the overlay) with “similar” availability as node x. According to the above
framework, we use an availability range of (±ǫ) around av(x) as candidate nodes for the horizontal
sliver at node x. The value of ǫ is fixed globally, and does not depend on the target ranges of
multicast or anycast operations (or vice-versa). Our experiments find that using ǫ = 0.1 suffices to
give good scalability and reliability for management tasks.
To understand the horizontal sliver concept intuitively, the reader may realize that the
horizontal sliver is somewhat like similar notions in DHTs, i.e., like the “leaf table entries” in
Pastry [87], and the “successors/predecessors” in Chord [92]. However, our setting is different since
those systems deal with hashed nodeIDs, while we are dealing with availability space instead. The
horizontal sliver helps to maintain a connected overlay among nodes with availability around
av(x). Notice that if there are L such nodes, the number of neighbors has to be O(log(L)),
selected uniformly at random, for connectivity to hold with high probability (w.h.p.) [36].
On the other hand, a vertical sliver at node x is defined as a random sample of nodes with
availabilities ranging all the way from 0 to 1. The goal of a vertical sliver is to maintain
connectivity throughout the system via a sufficient number of “long-distance” links (in availability
space) among nodes. This is most akin to the routing table entries in Pastry or Chord
DHTs [87,92]. However, once again, we are dealing with the availability space rather than hashed
nodeIDs, thus our problem setting is quite different.
Below we describe and analyze several AVMEM predicates. Some of these predicates will
assume knowledge of the expected system size (i.e., number of online nodes) as a parameter N (see
Chapter 2, item 16).
While vs() and hs() can be arbitrary, below we first discuss several useful options for selecting
the vertical sliver (i.e., different vertical sub-predicates) and then for selecting the horizontal sliver
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(i.e., different horizontal sub-predicates).
4.6.2 Vertical Sub-predicate Possibilities
There are several ways of specifying the vertical sliver sub-predicate, i.e., vs(). We discuss three
options below, in increasing order of complexity. We are most interested in the second option —
Logarithmic Vertical Sliver, eq. 4.3 — and analyze it in detail in Section 4.6.4. The first option we
discuss is availability-independent:
vs(av(x), av(y), p(.)) =
c1 · log(N)
N
[Constant Vertical Sliver] (4.2)
Here, c1 is a constant. Recall that N is also constant. This predicate works best in a system
where the availability PDF distribution is a uniform one. However, distributed systems rarely have
homogeneous availability PDFs. This motivates us to consider other predicates that are more
expressive. We derive a very generic vertical sliver sub-predicate:
vs(av(x), av(y), p(.)) = min
(
c1 · log(N)
N · p(av(y)) , 1.0
)
[Logarithmic Vertical Sliver] (4.3)
Section 4.6.4 proves that this predicate ensures a uniformity of coverage of the availability
space (Theorem 4.6.1). In other words, for any availability range [b, b+ ǫ] (non-overlapping with
[av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ]), a node x will have the same expected number of vertical sliver neighbors in
this range, regardless of the value of b.
Finally, one may desire that the density of vertical sliver neighbors in an infinitesimal interval
around a value b becomes smaller and smaller as the absolute value of |b− av(x)| becomes larger
and larger. This would provide an overlay somewhat akin to Pastry routing table entries and
Chord finger table entries, where neighbors are chosen with exponentially increasing distance as
one moves away (there, in the hashed nodeID space). This is realized by the following predicate, as
proved in Corollary 4.6.1 of Section 4.6.4:
vs(av(x), av(y), p(.)) = min
(
c1 · log(N)
N · p(av(y)) · |av(y)− av(x)| , 1.0
)
[Logarithmic-Decreasing Vertical Sliver]
(4.4)
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4.6.3 Horizontal Sub-predicate Possibilities
Just like for vertical slivers, there are several possible horizontal sliver sub-predicates. We
enumerate two of them below. The second of these predicates — Logarithmic-Constant Horizontal
Sliver, eq. 4.6 — is more interesting, and is analyzed in Section 4.6.4.
The first option is to select a constant fraction of the nodes that lie in the availability range
[av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ]. The predicate is:
hs(av(x), av(y), p(.)) =
c2 · log(N)
N
[Constant Horizontal Sliver] (4.5)
Here, c2 is a constant. Recall that N is also constant. Although this ensures connectivity
w.h.p. among the nodes in this availability range, it involves too many nodes. Specifically, it is
possible that the range [av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ] contains much fewer nodes than N . This raises the
possibility that the size of the horizontal sliver at a node x can be reduced. This leads us to the
following predicate:
hs(av(x), av(y), p(.)) = min
(
c2 · log(Nav(x))
Nminav(x)
, 1.0
)
[Logarithmic-Constant Horizontal Sliver]
(4.6)
This formulation involves two new parameters — Nav(x) and N
min
av(x) . First, Nav(x) is the
expected number of online nodes in the availability range [av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ]. Mathematically,
this can be derived from the PDF of the availability distribution. That is,
Nav(x) = N ·
∫ av(x)+ǫ
av(x)−ǫ p(a) da, where N = the stable system size. Second, N
min
av(x) is the minimum
number of expected online nodes present in any availability interval of width ǫ that lies wholly
within [av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ]. This can also be calculated from the PDF of the availability
distribution as follows: Nminav(x) = N ·min
(∫ v+ǫ
v p(a) da, [v, v + ǫ] ⊆ [av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ]
)
.
Note that these values can be easily calculated from a discretized PDF distribution of the
system created from a small sample set of nodes.
∫ v+ǫ
v p(a) da is merely the number of nodes that
have availability lying in this interval, divided by the total number of entries in the discretized
PDF.
Section 4.6.4 shows, via Theorem 4.6.2 Theorem 4.6.3, that the logarithmic constant vertical
sliver sub-predicate maintains connectivity w.h.p. among all nodes lying in the range
[av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ].
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4.6.4 Analysis of AVMEM Predicates
In this section, we show that the logarithmic vertical sliver ensures uniformity of coverage in the
availability space (Theorem 4.6.1), the logarithmic-constant horizontal sliver ensures connectivity
among online nodes whose availabilities lie close to each other (Theorem 4.6.2), and that the above
two sliver rules together ensure a small, scalable set of online neighbors for each node in the
system (Theorem 4.6.3).
Theorem 4.6.1. The logarithmic vertical sliver sub-predicate (equation 4.3) ensures that, given a
node x, for any a ∈ [av(x)− ǫ, av(x) + ǫ], the expected number of online nodes with availability in
an (infinitesimally small) interval around a, that are vertical sliver neighbors of node x, does not
depend on the value of a.
Proof. The expected number of online nodes, in the vertical sliver of node x, that have their
availabilities lying in an interval of size da around a, is given as
=p(av(y))da ·N · c1·log(N)N ·p(av(y)) = c1 · log(N) da. This is independent of a.
Corollary 4.6.1. The logarithmic-decreasing vertical sub-predicate (equation 4.4) selects online
neighbors that are at exponentially increasing distances from node x, where distances are measured
in the availability space av(.). (The proof follows along similar lines as Theorem 4.6.1.)
Theorem 4.6.2. The logarithmic-constant horizontal sliver (equation 4.6) sub-predicate ensures
that for a given node x, the sub-overlay consisting of all online nodes with availabilities in the
interval [av(x) − ǫ, av(x) + ǫ] is connected w.h.p.
Proof. For the given node x, define X+ as the set of all online nodes (other than x itself) that
have availability ∈ [av(x), av(x) + ǫ]. Similarly, define X− as the set of all online nodes (other than
x) that have availability ∈ [av(x) − ǫ, av(x)). We will show the proof in three parts: (i) the
sub-overlay graph of nodes in X+ is connected w.h.p., (ii) the sub-overlay graph of nodes in X− is
connected w.h.p., and (iii) x knows at least one node in X+ and at least one node in X− w.h.p.
For any node u, define N+av(u) and N
−
av(u) as the expected number of online nodes lying
respectively in the upper half and lower half of the interval [av(u)− ǫ, av(u) + ǫ]. That is,
N+av(u) = N ·
∫ av(u)+ǫ
av(u) p(a) da, and N
−
av(u) = N ·
∫ av(u)
av(x)−ǫ p(a) da.
We first prove (i), and the proof of (ii) follows analogously. For any node y ∈ X+, notice first
that the interval [av(y)− ǫ, av(y) + ǫ] wholly contains the interval [av(x), av(x) + ǫ]. We use a
well-know result from [36] that in a graph of M nodes, if each node has Ω(log(M)) neighbors that
are selected at random, then the graph is connected w.h.p.
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Firstly, from the definition of the logarithmic-constant horizontal sliver rule, notice for each
node u that belongs to X+, the probability of y picking u as neighbor is independent of where
av(u) lies. Thus, neighbors are picked uniformly at random. Secondly, we need to show that if
there are M = N+av(x) nodes in the interval X
+, each node in that interval has an expected
Ω(log(M)) online neighbors lying in X+. From the horizontal sliver rule at node y, the expected
number of online nodes from the interval X+ that y has as neighbors is:
=
∫ av(x)+ǫ
av(x)
(
c2 ·
log
(
Nav(y)
)
Nminav(y)
· (N · p(a))
)
da
=
c2 · log
(
Nav(y)
)
Nminav(y)
·N+av(x)
≥ c2 · log
(
Nav(y)
)
, (since N+av(x) ≥ Nminav(y))
≥ c2 · log
(
N+av(x)
)
, (since Nav(y) ≥ N+av(x))
This completes the proof of (i), and thus (ii). Finally, to prove (iii), notice that we can derive,
based on the same reasoning as above, the probability of x knowing at least one node in the set
X+, and at least one node in X−, as:
≥

1−
(
1− c2 · log(N)
N+av(x)
)N+
av(x)

 ·

1−
(
1− c2 · log(N)
N−av(x)
)N−
av(x)


≥
(
1− e−c2·log(N)
)
·
(
1− e−c2·log(N)
)
≥
(
1− 2
(N)c2
)
Theorem 4.6.3. The logarithmic-constant horizontal sub-predicate (equation 4.6) and the
logarithmic vertical sub-predicate (equation 4.3) , together, ensure that the total expected number of
online neighbors (vertical sliver + horizontal sliver) at a given node x: (i) is at most
(Nav(x) − 1 + c1 · log(N)); and (ii) O(log(N)) if Nminav(x) = θ(N).
Proof. Consider a node x. From the discussion of Theorem 4.6.1’s proof, the expected number of
online vertical sliver neighbors at x is:
=
∫ av(x)−ǫ
0
c1 · log(N) da+
∫ 1
av(x)+ǫ
c1 · log(N) da
≤ c1 · log(N)
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Since the horizontal sliver at node x can contain at most (Nav(x) − 1) nodes, this proves the
part (i) of the theorem.
To show (ii), we use a similar derivation as in the discussion of Theorem 4.6.2’s proof. We can
show that the expected number of online horizontal sliver neighbors of node x is:
≤
∫ av(x)+ǫ
av(x)−ǫ
(
c2 ·
log
(
Nav(x)
)
Nminav(y) · ǫ
· (N · p(a))
)
da
= c2 ·
log
(
Nav(x)
)
Nminav(y)
·N
Since Nminav(x) = θ(N) and Nav(x) ≤ N , this is O(log(N)).
4.7 AVMEM Maintenance and Management Operations
We first discuss in Section 4.7.1 how nodes discover their AVMEM neighbors according to any
application-specified predicate. Then, Section 4.7.2 describes how the anycast and multicast
operations are executed atop the AVMEM overlay.
4.7.1 AVMEM Membership Maintenance
In this subsection, we first describe the techniques used by AVMEM to discover and maintain
neighbors, i.e., horizontal sliver (HS) and vertical sliver (V S) neighbors, in conformity with the
application-specified AVMEM predicate. We then analyze the optimality of this protocol, and
check whether the memory, bandwidth, and discovery time scale to medium-scale systems.
For discovery and maintenance, we leverage two types of existing services in a black-box
manner. These services are:
1. an availability monitoring service, e.g., centralized, or distributed such as AVMON
(Chapter 3); and
2. a decentralized shuﬄing partial membership service, e.g., SCAMP [36], CYCLON [100],
T-MAN [49], LOCKSS [63].
An availability monitoring service is defined as one that can be queried for the long-term
availability (e.g., raw, or aged) of any given node. It returns an answer that is reasonably accurate,
and that is reasonably consistent over time. The level of accuracy and consistency of course
depends on the actual availability monitoring protocol itself. The more accurate and consistent it
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is, the better our AVMEM discovery will perform. For our practical implementation, we leverage
our own availability monitoring service called AVMON (Chapter 3); our experiments show that
this gives good results. Furthermore, AVMON’s overhead is low; for instance, in a system with
2000 nodes, the average node bandwidth is 6.81Bps, average node memory is 52 Bytes, and
average node CPU time is 0.57ms per minute.
A decentralized shuﬄing membership service allows a node to maintain a random list of some
of the nodes in the system (irrespective of any predicate). This is a weakly consistent list that is
incomplete, and may even contain stale entries. Further, this list is shuﬄed, i.e., its contents are
continuously changed by the underlying shuﬄing protocol, so that given a node y and node x that
stay long enough in the system, the entry for node y will eventually appear in the shuﬄed list at
node x. For our practical implementation, we could have chosen any one of existing systems such
as SCAMP [36], CYCLON [100], T-MAN [49], LOCKSS [63], etc. However, we chose to use our
AVMON implementation’s underlying coarse view, CV , mechanism, which fulfills the requirements
of shuﬄing membership. This simplifies the overall design of our system, and Section 6.2 shows
this approach performs well in practice.
Given the above two services, the core AVMEM maintenance protocol consists of two
sub-protocols: (I) a Discovery sub-protocol, and (II) a Refresh sub-protocol. The discovery
protocol enables nodes to discover new AVMEM relationships and thus HS and V S neighbors. On
the other hand, the refresh protocol continuously checks whether existing HS and V S neighbors
still satisfy the predicate, and eliminates them if they do not. Each sub-protocol is elaborated
below.
I Discovery Sub-Protocol: At any given node x, the discovery protocol runs periodically,
i.e., once every TD =discovery protocol period time units (typically 1 minute). It iterates
through the entries in the coarse view (i.e., the shuﬄed membership list). For each entry node
y that is not already in HS(x) ∪ V S(x), it queries the availability monitoring service for the
availability of y, and checks the AVMEM predicate to see if y is a valid HS or V S neighbor of
x. If one of these sub-predicates evaluates to true, then y is included in HS(x) or V S(x), as
appropriate. We will soon analyze the discovery time of this protocol.
II Refresh Sub-protocol: The refresh sub-protocol periodically iterates through the entries
of the HS(x) and V S(x) lists. For each node y in these lists, the sub-protocol queries the
availability monitoring service for y’s current availability, and evaluates the appropriate
AVMEM predicate to see if M(x, y) = 1 or not. If M(x, y) has become 0, then y’s entry is
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Periodically (once every discovery protocol period, TD)
Let AV (x) = HS(x) ∪ V S(x);
∀u ∈ CV (x)
If u /∈ AV (x)
Request u’s availability,
If M(x, y) = 1
add to AV (x)
Figure 4.2: Discovery Sub-Protocol.
Periodically (once every TR)
let AV (x) = HS(x) ∪ V S(x)
∀y ∈ AV (x)
Request y’s availability
Remove y from AV (x)
Check predicate using y’s and x’s current availability
Add y to AV (x) if the condition is met
Figure 4.3: Refresh Sub-Protocol.
deleted from the appropriate list. It is easy to see that once M(x, y) becomes false, node x
will delete y from its AVMEM membership list within a worst case time of 1 TR =refresh
protocol period. In our implementation, we found that using a refresh period of 20 minutes
suffices for reasonable maintenance of AVMEM predicates. The time and message complexity
of this protocol is analyzed next.
4.7.1.1 Discovery Sub-Protocol — Optimality and Reality Check
The underlying shuﬄing membership protocols we are considering — SCAMP [36],
CYCLON [100], T-MAN [49], LOCKSS [63], AVMON’s coarse view (Section 3.7.3) — all maintain
a view of size v at each node, where the entries in this view are randomly selected as well as
continuously shuﬄed. Since our implementation is using AVMON, this v would be the same as
cvs, i.e., AVMON’s “coarse view size”. For AVMEM, we are concerned about the memory,
computation, and bandwidth spent by a node on the one hand, and the discovery time for
neighbors on the other hand. The former three scale linearly with v — memory is of course v,
computation comes from evaluating the predicate periodically for each entry in the view (thus v),
and bandwidth from fetching the availability information for these entries (O(v)).
Discovery time is defined as follows: given a pair of nodes x and y for which M(x, y) = 1, this
is the time until x actually includes y in its HS(x) or V S(x), as appropriate. The discovery time
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depends on the operation of the underlying shuﬄing protocol, but fortunately, the fact that there is
constant shuﬄing tells us that the expected time for a given node y to appear in x’s view is O(Nv ).
In order to optimize the above concerns, we thus wish to minimize f(v) = v + Nv .
Differentiating this with v, gives df(v)dv = 1− Nv2 = 0, or v = O(
√
N), which is a minimum. This is a
reasonably small number for medium-scale systems. Even for N = 100, 000, v =
√
N ≃ 320. With
20 B per entry and a 1 minute protocol period, the per-node memory is 6.3 KB, and the
bandwidth is 105 Bps. Finally, if the average discovery time is Nv protocol periods, this turns out
to be around 5 hours. This is reasonable given that large-scale Grid computations run for several
days, users survive in P2P systems for months, and PlanetLab nodes are up for years.
4.7.1.2 Refresh Sub-Protocol — Time and Message Complexity
The time complexity equals the number of entries in the horizontal sliver and vertical sliver, i.e.,
O(|HS(x)| + |V S(x)|). This translates to O(log(N)) if, for instance, the logarithmic-constant
horizontal sub-predicate (equation 4.6) and the logarithmic vertical sub-predicate (equation 4.3)
are used (see Theorem 4.6.3).
Likewise, the message complexity depends on the number of entries in both lists. Additionally,
it can depend on the overhead of the underlying availability monitoring service. If we assume (1)
an unoptimized implementation of AVMEM, i.e., with no local caching of previous replies to
availability queries, (2) use of the logarithmic-constant horizontal sub-predicate and the
logarithmic vertical sub-predicate, (3) use of AVMON as the monitoring service, then the message
complexity will be O(log(N) · log(N)): this arises from O(log(N)) number of entries and O(log(N))
messages per entry due to querying AVMON for that entry’s availability (see Chapter 3).
4.7.2 Management Operations over AVMEM
In this section, we describe algorithms for executing the four operations laid out in Section 4.1,
namely: threshold-multicast, threshold-anycast, range-multicast, and range-anycast. For ease of
exposition, we first discuss the two anycast operations, and then the multicast operations.
4.7.2.1 {Threshold, Range} Anycast
We discuss how to route an anycast message intended for range R — a threshold anycast follows a
similar approach, where the range R stretches from the threshold to 1.0. A node x receiving an
anycast message checks to see if it itself lies within range R — if yes, then the anycast is successful
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and we are done. Each anycast has a TTL (time-to-live) that is decremented by 1 at each virtual
hop. If this TTL value is 0 the message is not forwarded. In any other case the message is
forwarded to another node. We discuss three approaches for forwarding of an anycast below.
• Greedy Forwarding: Node x forwards the anycast to an AVMEM neighbor that lies inside R.
If there is no such neighbor, x selects as the next hop the neighbor whose availability is
closest to r.
• Retried Greedy Forwarding: To increase the reliability for anycasts, we allow nodes to retry a
prospective next-hop if the previous candidate was not responsive (i.e., was found to be
oﬄine). To implement this, we introduce an integer parameter retry, initialized to k at the
initiator. Each forwarded message carries the value of retry = k. This parameter determines
the number of nodes tried using the greedy metric, before dropping the message. Specifically,
each next-hop node is required to acknowledge receipt of the anycast message — failing this,
the previous hop node will decrement the value of retry by 1, and retry its next-best
neighbor, according to the greedy metric (i.e., distance to range target R). The retrying
stops when either retry reaches 0, or there are no more next-best nodes left in the AVMEM
neighbor list of node x.
• Simulated Annealing: An alternative approach is to follow simulated annealing, where the
probability of choosing a random next-hop is high initially (in the first few hops) but
decreases as the anycast proceeds. Specifically, we choose p = e−∆/ttl, where ttl = remaining
time to live, and ∆ = the Euclidean distance between the edge of R and the availability of
the current next-hop under consideration. At each hop, a random next-hop can be selected
(from among the AVMEM neighbors) with probability p, as the list of neighbors is traversed,
otherwise the greedy approach is used (with probability (1− p)).
A few notes are due about the above approaches. Each of the above three variants naturally
has three flavors, depending on whether only the horizontal sliver neighbors of x are used
(HS-only), only the vertical sliver is used (VS-only), or whether both are used (HS+VS). To be
generic, we referred to the considered set of sliver neighbors as merely “AVMEM neighbors” above.
Thus, we have a total of nine algorithms. Section 6.2 presents data on the most promising variants.
Further, when node x is considering potential next-hops for an anycast, it uses cached values of
availabilities for its neighbors. Typically, these cached values were fetched the last time the refresh
operation was done at node x — this eschews querying the availability service for each forwarded
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message. Section 6.2 evaluates how much using cached values allows flooding attacks by selfish
nodes.
4.7.2.2 {Threshold, Range} Multicast
For these operations, we once again consider only the range R; the threshold-based variant follows
similarly. The multicast operation follows a two-stage process: an anycast into the range R,
followed by a multicast within the range. The anycast follows the techniques listed above. Hence,
we now discuss multicast only when the initiator is within the range R. Once a node x has
received a multicast message M for a range R (where av(x) ∈ R), it can use one of two approaches
for forwarding it:
• Flooding: Node x forwards the multicast to all its AVMEM neighbors that lie in range R.
Any duplicate copies of the multicast are ignored, and the forwarding is done only once. This
is a highly reliable approach, but is wasteful since each node will receive multiple copies of
the multicast — in the worst case, it may receive one copy from each of its in-neighbors.
• Gossip: To avoid the above overhead, we use a gossip-based approach. Here, node x (after
receiving the multicast) gossips the multicast M . It does so periodically — once every
protocol period seconds, it selects up to fanout of its AVMEM neighbors: (1) whose
availabilities lie within the range R, and (2) to whom x has not already forwarded M . These
neighbors could be selected randomly, but for our implementation we use a deterministic
iteration through the list in order to select gossip targets. The node repeats the above
process for Ng protocol periods after it first receives the multicast. Any duplicate copies of
the multicast it receives are eliminated. We select Ng and fanout so that
(Ng · fanout) = log(N), thus ensuring dissemination w.h.p. via gossip [36].
Just as for anycast, there are three variants for each of the above two approaches — HS-only,
VS-only, and HS+VS, depending on which set of AVMEM neighbors are used for the operations.
This gives us a total of six algorithms. We implemented all these options, and Section 6.2 presents
data from the best ones.
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Chapter 5
Availability-aware Aggregation
5.1 Motivation
Distributed applications aggregate various kinds of data from large populations of nodes. Resource
utilization information is collected about nodes in order to enable resource discovery for Grid
applications [64, 97]. Statistics of system performance are collected [58, 105], e.g., max, min, top-k,
or bottom-k of CPU utilization. Votes may be collected from nodes, and the majority of answers
used to make a go-no-go decision, e.g., for leader election or replication [63].
The above systems use aggregation within the network in order to scalably and efficiently
compute the aggregate, and deliver it to a sink node. However, in environments where nodes have
varying degrees of contribution to the system, one often desires to collect biased aggregates so that
nodes that have contributed more to the system have a bigger say in the final aggregate. In such a
biased aggregation, for each node, the probability that a global aggregate will include that node’s
own value (henceforth we call this inclusion probability), increases with that node’s contribution to
the system. Notice that the inclusion probability for a node is calculated only across global
aggregates initiated while that node is online. Such biased aggregation can be useful to mitigate
freeloading [6] by ensuring that nodes that contribute comparatively less to the system, influence
the aggregate less. We consider a specific type of contribution, namely node availability.
We allow the inclusion probability of a node’s value to be specified as a mathematical function
of that node’s availability. This relation is the global predicate that the application deployer would
desire applied to all nodes in the system. We denote this global predicate as g, and we focus only
on monotonically non-decreasing predicates. For instance, the deployer might specify a linear
predicate, i.e., the inclusion probability of each node x is g(x) = av(x), where av(x) is that node’s
availability. As another example, a quadratic predicate may be desired, e.g., g(x) = (av(x))2, or a
bimodal predicate, e.g., if (av(x) > 0.5) g(x) = 1.0 else g(x) = 0.0.
Unlike other approaches that implicitly scale node benefit approximately according to its
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contribution [44, 95], our approach allows us to explicitly specify this relation as a mathematical
function, thus giving a better control over the quality of aggregation. This control enables the use
of the aggregation protocol for various purposes. For instance, one can calculate the average
available disk space throughout the system, by using the linear predicate along with the “average”
aggregation function over the disk space attribute at nodes. If concerns over data durability
increase, then the previous aggregation could use the quadratic predicate, thus resulting in a disk
space measurement more biased towards what’s available at higher-availability nodes. Another
example is using the bimodal (or quadratic) predicate along with the “min” aggregation function
over ids of nodes. This produces a leader election protocol where only high availability nodes can
become leaders. In general the bimodal or quadratic predicate can be used to penalize low
availability nodes — compared to the use of the linear predicate — and thus provide incentive for
them to improve their availability.
5.2 Problem Statement
The problem of using local and distributed actions at nodes to achieve an arbitrary and emergent
global predicate is a challenging one. There is a need to scale to systems with hundreds or
thousands of nodes, as well as to withstand churn, i.e., arrival, departure and failure of nodes.
Further challenges come from the fact that nodes may be selfish and colluding (see Chapter 2, and
Section 2.2). Selfish and colluding behavior can arise from node gaming [86] or multiple
administrative domains (MADs) [7]. This behavior can adversely influence the predicate
satisfaction in any solution to our aggregation problem. For instance, in the above examples,
selfish nodes may end up unfairly biasing the measured average available disk space. A group of
colluders may end up influencing the leader election to always elect one of them as leader
(regardless of their availability).
The desired global predicate, that relates a node x’s availability av(x) to the inclusion
probability for its data in an aggregate, is denoted by the function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. We make two
assumptions about g: (1) g is monotonically non-decreasing, i.e., if av(x) > av(y) for two nodes
x, y, then it is true that g(av(x)) ≥ g(av(y)); (2) g(1.0) = 1.0, i.e., a node that is always online will
desire to have its data appear in all aggregates. For instance, this is true at the sink node.
The problem we address is then, informally, as follows:
Given an arbitrary desired global predicate g, design an aggregation protocol so that
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for each node x, x’s contributed value(s) appears with probability g(av(x)) in the
global aggregates at the sink, calculated only across epochs during which x is online.
5.3 Assumptions and System Model
This section elaborates and extends the assumptions that we make additionally to those in
Chapter 2, for the aggregation problem.
1. In line to the selfish and colluding behavior mentioned in Chapter 2, in this setting a selfish
node takes actions that increases its own inclusion probability, independent of its actual
availability. Moreover, colluding nodes aim to increase their inclusion probabilities,
independent of their actual availabilities.
2. Additionally, these selfish and colluding nodes are not interested in affecting other nodes’
inclusion probabilities (recall from Chapter 2 that we do not consider malicious or Byzantine
behavior). In other words, a node deviates from the specified protocol behavior only when
the deviation improves the inclusion probability of either itself, or some of its colluders.
Thus, selfish nodes may execute local actions, while colluding nodes may use friends, all to
increase their own inclusion probabilities, e.g., by double forwarding of own values. However,
nodes never maliciously modify their own values or partial aggregates. We assume an
arbitrary number of selfish nodes in the system.
3. Aggregations occur in rounds, called epochs. Each epoch is uniquely identified by using the
sink node’s id and a signed epoch number. Epochs could be initiated either (a)
asynchronously, initiated by the sink, or (b) periodically, at synchronized times across all
nodes (e.g., helped by NTP). We support both these options. Epochs do not overlap, and
inter-epoch time intervals are larger than the typical time to finish an aggregation.
4. Each aggregation epoch is associated with a single sink node which desires to calculate the
aggregate. We assume henceforth for simplicity that the same sink node is used in all epochs;
our algorithms work even when the sink differs across epochs. We will also assume that the
sink is (i) always online, i.e., has an availability of 1.0, and (ii) is not selfish or collusive with
any other node. These assumptions are reasonable because we want aggregation anytime,
and at a trusted sink node.
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5. The aggregation statistic desired by the sink is partially aggregatable within the network,
i.e., the tree is used for in-network aggregation. In other words, akin to [64, 97, 105], we
assume that combining two partial aggregates into another aggregate, does not increase the
size of the message. Some partially aggregatable functions are top-k, bottom-k, max, min,
count, sum, and average (aggregated as sum and count).
6. We assume the presence of an availability monitoring service resilient to selfish and colluding
nodes. This system can be AVMON (Chapter 3), and we elaborate further in Section 5.4.
7. The node availability probability density function (PDF) remains fairly stable across time.
Just like N (item 16 in Chapter 2), this has been shown to be stable in several deployed P2P
systems [93]. Thus, it can be measured and used as a system-wide parameter that would be
updated infrequently (e.g., once a month), without affecting scalability. This measurement
can be done by the availability monitoring service, e.g., AVMON.
5.4 Solution
We present AVCOL, an availability-aware aggregation service that implements arbitrary global
predicates for biased aggregation. AVCOL works in environments where nodes may be selfish or
colluding. AVCOL uses a novel combination of four techniques: (1) building aggregation trees
on-demand, where nodes select parents (or children) based on availability, (2) restricting the choice
of valid parents (or children) based on a consistent condition, (3) probabilistic forwarding of child
data up to parents at each internal tree node, and (4) periodic (i.e., gossip-style) and
per-aggregation auditing to verify correct node behavior and prevent collusion. AVCOL can be
seen as incorporating availability dependence with a probabilistic aggregation approach.
AVCOL leverages two services in a black-box manner: (1) a distributed availability monitoring
service (2) a decentralized probabilistically-shuﬄed membership protocol [37, 49, 100]. The
distributed availability monitoring service keeps track of the availability of nodes, and allows any
node’s availability to be queried. The reported availability could be either raw, aged, or
window-based (recent). We assume a consistent availability monitoring service, i.e., simultaneous
queries (e.g., from multiple nodes) for availability of a given node all return the same value. Our
implementation uses the AVMON decentralized monitoring system (Chapter 3), and our
experiments measure the effect of any inconsistencies arising from this use. We will elaborate on
the decentralized shuﬄed membership protocol in Section 5.8.2, where it is first used by our design.
55
These two leveraged services are themselves resilient to uncollaborative nodes. Recall from
Chapter 3 that AVMON reports accurate availabilities in spite of large numbers of uncollaborative
nodes. As Section 5.8.2 shows, we use the membership protocol only for selecting children and
parents in the aggregation tree — thus an uncollaborative node cannot increase its own inclusion
probability by tampering with the membership.
AVCOL implements its global predicates in a similar way to AVMEM’s (Chapter 4)
decentralized availability-aware predicates for membership. The availability-aware aggregation
problem addressed in these pages is a natural follow-up, and extends the idea of global predicates
to the aggregation problem. This problem requires an entirely new set of design techniques.
The probabilistic aggregation in AVCOL trees is described in Section 5.6, while Section 5.7
discusses how trees are constructed in spite of selfish and colluding nodes. Section 5.8 presents our
auditing scheme, and we present experimental results in Section 6.3.
5.5 Related Work
Centralized aggregation schemes based on user scripts or CoMon-like tools [109] collect a lot of
information periodically (e.g., once every 10 minutes) from all nodes, maintaining these in a
queriable database. Decentralized aggregation schemes scale better by using in-network
aggregation. Many of these build aggregation trees either based on domain layout (e.g.,
Astrolabe [97] or Ganglia [64]), or by using a structured overlay (e.g., SDIMS [105], PIER [47],
or [11]), or randomly on demand (e.g., MON [58]), or based on other techniques. Robust
aggregation can be done either via gossip [50, 51] or via multiple paths in sensor networks [74].
However, none of these systems above have addressed the effect of selfish or colluding nodes.
Similar to many decentralized approaches, AVCOL builds per-aggregation trees. Yet, unlike them,
AVCOL innovates in being the first to satisfy explicit availability-based predicates.
Game theoretic techniques have been applied for systems with arbitrary rational nodes [86],
yet they are often too complex and bandwidth-consuming for large distributed systems. The BAR
model [7] considers Byzantine, altruistic and rational nodes, but has not been applied to the
aggregation problem. In addition, BAR allows rational nodes only to be selfish, but not colluding.
While AVCOL does not consider Byzantine (malicious) attacks, it does address aggregation under
selfish and colluding behavior.
While traditional protocols typically provide a deterministic bound on the number of
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attackers, e.g., [16], AVCOL tolerates an arbitrary number of selfish nodes. In addition, it provides
a probabilistic tolerance to large numbers of colluders in the system. Finally, auditing mechanisms
have been used to ensure replica correctness in spite of attacks and bit-rot in LOCKSS [63], as well
as for detection of Byzantine behavior in PeerReview [43]. Similar to PeerReview, AVCOL reports
selfish and colluding nodes via signed non-repudiable proofs.
5.6 Probabilistic Aggregation in AVCOL Trees
We first describe how AVCOL trees aggregate data in order to satisfy a given global predicate g.
While Section 5.7 will describe how these trees are constructed in order to combat selfish and
colluding nodes, the tree aggregation itself is agnostic to such uncollaborative nodes. In other
words, the current section assumes no nodes are selfish or colluding.
AVCOL trees are built so that each node x’s tree parent has an availability ≥ av(x). In other
words, if a node y is a tree parent of a node x, then it is true that av(y) ≥ av(x). Notice that any
node in the system can find a prospective parent with a higher or equal availability than itself,
since in the worst case it can go to the sink node which has an availability of 1.0. Inductively, this
implies that an AVCOL tree can be built to cover all nodes in the system. Section 5.7 describes
tree construction; we now focus on the aggregation and predicate satisfaction. Figure 5.1
illustrates an example aggregation tree, and we elaborate below.
Each AVCOL node x uses the following probabilistic aggregation while passing data up
towards the sink. If node x is a leaf in the tree, it sends a message to its parent containing its own
value. If node x is an internal node, it waits to hear from all of its children. Each child c reports
an aggregate (denoted as AG(c)) for the subtree rooted at c. Node x then forwards to its own
parent a partial aggregate that: (1) includes x’s own value with probability 1.0, and (2) for each
child c, includes AG(c) with probability g(av(c))g(av(x)) . Notice that this latter quantity is ≤ 1 as a
parent’s availability is never lower than a child’s. In doing this aggregation, the node can use
in-network aggregation to calculate a compact partial aggregation (e.g., sum, count, for avg.). The
sink node executes step (2) as well, and uses the resulting aggregate as the final answer.
Theorem 5.6.1. Consider an epoch during which no nodes join, leave or fail from the system.
For any node x that is online and in the tree during this epoch, its own value appears in the global
aggregate reported at the sink node S, with probability g(av(x)).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the distance of node x from the sink. For the base case, notice
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Figure 5.1: Example Aggregation Tree. g(av(node)) is shown for each node, and messages should
be read as {datavalue:probability}, with probabilities multiplicative. Final message at top shows
resultant inclusion probabilities for each node in the global aggregate. Notice that joining the sink
directly as child does not increase inclusion probability.
that the sink node S’s data is included with probability 1.0 = g(av(S)). Now for any other node x
with parent P , P will include x’s value in the aggregate sent to P ’s parent, with probability
g(av(x))
g(av(P )) . If this does happen, then x’s data will always accompany P ’s own value (which is passed
up to P ’s parent with probability 1.0), either all the way up to the sink or until it is
probabilistically dropped at some ancestor of P . Thus, by induction, since P ’s own value will
appear with probability g(av(P )) in the global aggregate, the probability that x’s own value will
appear in the global aggregate at sink S is = g(av(P )) · g(av(x))g(av(P )) = g(av(x)). Note that this result
holds even if the node is a direct child of the sink node.
5.7 AVCOL Tree Construction
In a realistic setting with node churn, and with selfish and colluding nodes, the static AVCOL
trees of Section 5.6 may be ineffective. This is due to many reasons. Firstly, if parent-child
relationships are static, then for each node x that is oﬄine during an epoch, all of x’s tree
descendants will have their values not included in the global aggregate. This will happen for all
epochs when x is oﬄine. Secondly, during any epoch, a node x may send its data to more than one
parent, thus potentially increasing x’s inclusion probability via multiple counting. These
additional parents may be either colluders of x (who will pass on to their parents, x’s data), or just
unaware that x is selfishly sending duplicates.
AVCOL addresses these problems by dynamically constructing per-epoch aggregation trees. It
works by: (I) providing each node a flexible choice of parents (or children) for each aggregation
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Figure 5.2: Child selection (left) and Parent selection (right) example at node x.
epoch; (II) limiting this choice to a small set of valid parents (or children) that are selected based
on a consistent condition; and (III) running audit operations at the valid parents of each node to
verify its correct behavior. We describe these operations in the following sections. Intuitively
though, design choice (I) builds trees on the fly for each epoch — nodes try to “route around”
oﬄine parents, and manage to create a path to the sink with high probability (w.h.p.). (II)
reduces the probability that two colluding nodes will be allowed to be parent and child. Finally,
(III) ensures that colluding nodes, and nodes sending data to multiple parents during an epoch,
are eventually caught and blackmarked.
AVCOL has two alternative flavors — child selection where nodes select children
(Section 5.7.1), and parent selection where nodes select select parents (Section 5.7.2). Child
selection and parent selection are illustrated with an example in Figure 5.2. We describe these
selection criteria next, and present their analysis. Subsequently, Section 5.8 discusses how nodes
discover children or parents, and the auditing mechanism.
5.7.1 Child Selection Approach
In this variant, each node x selects and discovers multiple valid children in the tree. The validity of
a prospective child node y depends only on the ids and availabilities of x and y, and is independent
of everything else in the system. Then, during any given epoch, node x selects as its tree children,
fanout random nodes among its valid children. It collects aggregates from these tree children
using the probabilistic forwarding of Section 5.6. x is free to choose different tree children in
subsequent epochs. We first describe the validity condition for child selection, and then the
per-epoch aggregation.
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5.7.1.1 Selection Criteria for Valid Children
At a node x, a remote node y is a valid child if and only if the following consistent condition is
true: (i) av(x) ≥ av(y), and (ii) also
H(x, y) < min
(
K
N
· 1
cdfav(av(x))
, 1.0
)
(details to follow). Conversely, x is said to be a valid parent of y if both these conditions are true.
Here, H is a consistent hash function with range in the interval [0, 1]. For instance, H could be
either SHA-1 or MD-5, with outputs normalized to [0, 1]. x and y used within the hash function
are the bit-strings representing the ids of these nodes, e.g., their ip address + port.
As described in our system model in Section 2.1, N is a fixed parameter, and is set to the
estimated number of online nodes in the system. K is a small fixed parameter, set to the expected
number of valid children, typically K = θ(log(N)). cdfav() is the fraction of online nodes with an
availability ≤ av(x), i.e., it is the cumulative distribution function of node availability. The value
of cdfav() can be obtained from the probability distribution function (PDF) of the node
availability across the system. Recall that the PDF can be measured by the availability monitoring
service, and that it changes infrequently (see Section 5.3).
The discovery of the above valid children is discussed in Section 5.8.2; we now analyze the
properties of the selection scheme itself.
Theorem 5.7.1. At a given node x, the above child selection scheme has the following desirable
properties: (a) choice of valid children is uniformly at random from among all nodes with
availability lower than av(x), (b) consistency of the parent-child relation in spite of any system
changes extraneous to x and y, and (c) verifiability of this relation at any third node. Further, the
expected number of valid children for any node is O(K ). Finally, if K = θ(log(N)), then the
graph created by the valid parent-child relationships is strongly connected w.h.p.
Proof. The child selection is random since it picks a node y (among those with av(y) ≤ av(x))
with a uniform probability min
(
K
N · 1cdfav(av(x)) , 1.0
)
. The consistent hash function ensures that
the valid parent-child relationship depends only on the ids and availability of x, y. The validity is
verifiable at any third node, which can check the consistent condition using only the ids of x, y,
and their availabilities fetched from the availability monitoring service.
Next, the expected number of nodes with availability lower than av(x) is cdfav(av(x)) ·N , and
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thus the expected number of valid children of x is:
≤
(
K
N
1
cdfav(av(x))
)
(cdfav(av(x)) ·N) = K .
Finally, theoretical results about random digraphs (if avg. degree > 1, there is a giant
component) [21, 30] can be used to show that if K = θ(log(N)), then the graph created by the
valid parent-child relationships is strongly connected w.h.p.
5.7.1.2 Per-Epoch Aggregation
During each epoch, the sink initiates the protocol by sending a signed tree request to itself.
Suppose a node x sends y a signed tree request — y first checks if x is a valid parent (according to
the consistent condition), or if x = y = the sink. If neither is true, y reports x as an
uncollaborative node; the received tree request serves as non-repudiable proof of this accusation. If
x is a valid parent, y responds to it with an acknowledgement; further, y will refuse any future tree
requests during this epoch, sending negative acknowledgements to such requests (unless y is selfish
or colluding). Once a signed tree request has been received, y randomly chooses up to fanout
among its valid children, after verifying that they are still online and still satisfy the consistency
condition. y then sends these potential children signed tree requests from itself.
Since recruiting children does not affect a node’s own inclusion probability, a node has no
incentive not to recruit valid children. However, a colluding node may have an incentive to either
always (i.e., in every epoch) select as tree child a colluder node that already happens to be a valid
child, or to select as tree child a colluder node that is not a valid child. This enables the colluder
(i.e., the tree child) to send its data to either a non-valid parent, or to multiple parents. These two
behaviors are addressed by the auditing mechanisms described in Section 5.8.
In the aggregation for a given epoch, a node is a leaf if it either sends no tree requests (it
might not know any valid children), or it received negative acknowledgements to all its requests, or
it timed out before receiving an aggregate from any child. A leaf merely sends its own value, after
signing it, to its parent. Otherwise, consider an internal node that has received aggregates from
one or more valid children that it had sent tree requests to. This internal node waits until either
all its tree children have replied or a local timeout has elapsed. This node then audits these
children (described in Section 5.8.1); if this succeeds, x then uses the probabilistic forwarding rule
previously described in Section 5.6 to send the aggregated data to its parent. This data is signed
before being sent. All timeout values used at the leaf and internal nodes are (c · log(N)); this is
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motivated by our latency calculations below. This timeout is local and based on when the
aggregation started at this node.
Once again, a selfish/colluding node has no incentive to time out early, or to maliciously drop
any of its children’s reported aggregates, since this does not affect the inclusion probability of itself
or any of its colluders. However, a node that colludes with some of its children (e.g., a non-valid
child, or a child sending data to multiple parents) may want to prevent this collusion from being
discovered by either not auditing, or by lying about the auditing result. Section 5.8 catches these
behaviors.
A couple of closing notes — first, although a node can have at most one parent per epoch, this
parent can be different across epochs. This provides fault-tolerance. Second, for either
asynchronous or periodic aggregation, if a correct node did not receive any tree request from a
parent during a given epoch, then it never participates in the tree for that epoch. We call such
nodes as orphans, and their presence reduces the coverage of the tree, which we analyze next.
5.7.1.3 Analysis
Child selection basically creates a random spanning tree among the nodes, with the sink as the
tree root. We now calculate the coverage C of the tree, i.e., the probability of a node being reached
from the sink by the tree during an epoch. Coverage of a node is important since it is a
prerequisite for the satisfaction of the global predicate at that node.
In order to isolate tree performance from uncollaborative behavior, we analyze coverage when
all nodes are correct (i.e., not selfish or colluding). Suppose node x has K valid parents, and let
NC = 1− C=non-coverage probability, so that NC ≪ 1. Node x is not covered during an epoch
only if either (i) all of its valid parents are oﬄine, or (ii) none of its valid parents are covered, or
(iii) none of the valid parents choose x as a child for this epoch. If a is the expected availability
across x’s valid parents (a thus increases as av(x) rises), then we can write these three probabilities
as: NC ≤ (1− a)K +NCK + (1−NCK ) · (1− fanout
K
)K . Now, let us assume K = m1 · log(N),
fanout = m2 · log(N), and m2 ≤ m1, where m1,m2 are constants. The results of gossip-based tree
building in [30] indicate that under these conditions, NC ≪ 1. Eliminating small terms:
NC ≤ (1 − a)K +NCK + (1 −NCK ) · e−fanout
≃ (1 − a)K + e−fanout
=
1
Nm1·log
1
1−a
+
1
Nm2
.
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Hence, if one uses high enough constant values for m1,m2, the coverage of the child selection
approach is C = Ω(1− o(1)). Specifically, choosing m1 · log 11−a ,m2 ≥ 1 yields coverage probability
C = Ω(1− 1N ).
A caveat in the above analysis is that as av(x) increases, so does a, and thus the coverage
probability of node x may decrease. Thus, if one were to set the parameter value of
K = log 1
1−a∗
(N) to be same at all nodes, one should plug in a high enough value of a∗ in order to
still obtain good coverage for such nodes. Higher availability nodes that see themselves excluded
from too many epochs (i.e., not satisfying the global predicate) can use sink redirection, i.e., such
nodes can request the sink and become its direct tree children. Due to probabilistic forwarding at
the sink (Section 5.6), this redirection still satisfies the predicate at these nodes.
Finally, one can use results from gossip multicast [26] to show that the latency of aggregation
— i.e., time from aggregate initiation to completion — is O(log(N)). The choice of timeout in
waiting for children’s answers is motivated by this calculation.
5.7.2 Parent Selection Approach
In comparison to child selection, parent selection has each node (1) select and discover multiple
valid parents based on a consistent condition, and (2) for each epoch, select one of its valid parents
as a tree parent, in order to forward data from itself and its children.
5.7.2.1 Selection Criteria for Valid Parents
At a node x, a remote node y is a valid parent if and only if the following consistent condition is
true: (i) av(x) ≤ av(y), and (ii) also
H(x, y) < min
(
K
N
· 1
1− cdfav(av(x)) , 1.0
)
.
Conversely, x is said to be a valid child of y if both above conditions are true. The definition of H
and cdfav() remain the same as in Section 5.7.1. Similar to child selection, we can prove:
Theorem 5.7.2. At a given node x, the above parent selection scheme has the following desirable
properties: (a) choice of valid children is uniformly at random from among all nodes with
availability higher than av(x), (b) consistency of the parent-child relation in spite of any system
changes extraneous to x and y, and (c) verifiability of this relation at any third node. Further, the
expected number of valid parents for any node is O(K ). Finally, if K = θ(log(N)), then the graph
63
created by the valid parent-child relationships is strongly connected w.h.p.
5.7.2.2 Per-Epoch Aggregation
The aggregation tree is built starting from the sink. Each node selects a tree parent from among
its valid parents. In order to do this, each node maintains a local, binary state variable for each
epoch. The node can be in one of two states — intree or notintree. At the start of an epoch, only
the sink is intree, while all other nodes are notintree. We now describe the tree construction
separately for each of the periodic and asynchronous problem settings.
First, for periodic aggregation, at the start of the synchronized epoch, each node sends one
tree request to each of its valid parents. A node selects as its tree parent the first reply received to
any of these requests, and then changes to intree. The node in turn also queues all its received
tree requests from valid children, and acknowledges them all when its own state first turns to
intree. On the other hand, in the asynchronous aggregation setting, each node periodically asks
each valid parent for the latest epoch numbers for which the parent is intree. For a given epoch,
whenever node x first discovers any of its valid parents that happens to be intree, then x does the
following: (i) selects this as its tree parent, (ii) sends it a tree request, and (iii) marks itself (i.e., x)
as intree. In a nutshell then, both the periodic and asynchronous schemes have the effect of the
intree state propagating top-down from the sink node.
Notice that selfish nodes have no incentive to lie about their intree/notintree state, since
recruiting children does not increase one’s inclusion probability. Further, all messages carrying this
state are signed so that they can be used to prove valid parent-child relationships. Thus, the only
downside of this protocol is that it potentially makes it possible for selfish nodes to acquire
non-valid parents — Section 5.8 catches these.
If a node does not find any of its valid parents marked as intree before a timeout expires, then
it uses sink redirection, i.e., it sends a tree request directly to the sink. The timeout is chosen as
c · log(N), is local to the node, and starts at the same time as the current aggregation epoch. The
sink may receive many tree requests; however, having the sink as tree parent does not improve a
node’s inclusion probability (due to the analysis in Theorem 5.6.1).
Finally, a node that has succeeded in recruiting a tree parent performs aggregation by using
the probabilistic forwarding of Section 5.6. A leaf node waits awhile (timeout chosen as c · log(N)
since it recruited the parent) before sending its value up to its parent. An internal tree node waits
until either the timeout elapses, or until all its tree children — those that requested a parent and
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were acknowledged — have responded. It then audits the tree children (described in Section 5.8);
if this succeeds, it uses the probabilistic forwarding from Section 5.6. All aggregate messages sent
to a tree parent are signed.
Similar to child selection, a node x has no incentive to time out early or drop any received
aggregate from a tree child. However, such a node x may still lie about a colluder tree child that is
a non-valid child, or about a valid child sending data to x and multiple tree parents during the
same epoch. These are addressed by Section 5.8.1.
5.7.2.3 Analysis
First, one can show that the expected height of the parent selection tree during an epoch is
O(log(N)) [26]. Second, these trees obtain good coverage even without sink redirection, as we
show below.
Theorem 5.7.3. Consider an epoch during which no nodes join or leave. Suppose that each
online node has at least one path to the sink via valid child to parent pointers. Then each online
node is included in that epoch’s tree, i.e., coverage is 100%.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the distance from the sink, i.e., minimum length of a
path from the node to the sink. The base case is true since any valid child of a sink node will
become its tree child soon after the sink turns intree. Consider a node x at distance i from the
sink — at least one of its valid parents is at distance (i− 1), will turn intree during this epoch
(induction hypothesis), and thus x will also turn intree.
Thus, parent selection provides 100% coverage, which is better than the probabilistic coverage
of child selection. However, this comes at the cost of higher bandwidth overhead, as potential
parents need to be polled each epoch for an acknowledgement (to find out whether any has been
marked intree). Keep in mind that in parent selection nodes only keep track of potential parents.
We will evaluate and compare the child and parent selection strategies in Section 6.3.
5.8 Auditing and Discovery
This section describes how nodes carry out per-epoch audit operations (Section 5.8.1), how nodes
discover children or parents (Section 5.8.2), and periodic audit operations (Section 5.8.3). The
audit operations detect selfish nodes and small collusion groups eventually, while probabilistically
preventing large collusion groups from having an impact.
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5.8.1 Per-aggregation Auditing
We describe per-epoch audit operations that aim to detect pairs of colluding nodes which are not
valid parent-children (i.e., do not satisfy the consistent condition), yet acted as tree
parent-children during the given epoch. These per-aggregation audit operations apply to both the
child and parent selection flavors of AVCOL.
Consider a node x forwarding a partial aggregate message with its contribution and
contributions from its tree children — the ones included by the predicate — to its tree parent P .
This message is signed by node x. Denote the aggregates from x’s tree children C1, C2, . . . , Cm
respectively as AG1, AG2, . . . , AGm, x’s own value as v(x), and the aggregate calculated from the
above (m+ 1) values as AGx. Denote the corresponding signed messages received from each Ci as
{AGi}Ci. Then, the message sent by x is: {AGx, C1, {AG1}C1 , . . . , Cm, {AGm}Cm , v(x)}x.
When parent P receives this signed message, it first verifies whether x is indeed a valid child of
P . This auditing is done by fetching the availability of x from the availability service, and checking
the consistency condition. If the check fails, P can report x as an incorrect node, with the above
signed message included in the report as a verifiable, non-repudiable and non-forgeable proof1. If x
is a valid child, P next verifies for each Ci, whether x is a valid parent of Ci. If all Ci’s pass this
test, x then checks whether AGx is indeed a correct aggregate derived from AG1, . . . , AGm, v(x).
If this succeeds as well, then P probabilistically forwards AGx to its own tree parent, as described
earlier in Section 5.6. However, if P finds some Ci to not satisfy the hash consistency condition,
then it reports both x and Ci as colluding nodes. The signed aggregation message received from x
is a verifiable, non-repudiable and non-forgeable proof of collusion. Formally:
Lemma 5.8.1. If node x is not a valid parent of y, but acts as its tree parent during some epoch,
and if none of the colluders of x are its valid parents, then x and y will be reported.
Let us call the above as a 2-hop auditing scheme since each node checks for validity of tree
parent-child relationships up to 2 hops below it in the tree. In general, the above scheme can be
generalized to t-hop auditing by passing along signed aggregation messages from all its tree
descendants up to t hops below it, and subjecting it to consistency checks. We can thus generalize:
Theorem 5.8.1. If no group of colluding nodes has more than t nodes, then the t-hop auditing
scheme will detect at least two such colluding nodes.
1E.g., Such reports can either be sent to a central auditor, or fed into a reputation system.
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In addition to the above deterministic detection for small collusion groups, AVCOL also
provides probabilistic tolerance to collusions. We show this via two theorems:
Theorem 5.8.2. Given a group of M colluding nodes selected randomly from across the node
population, and M ≪ 3
√
N
K
(i.e., K ·M
3
N = o(1)), it is true w.h.p. that no pair of colluders is
related as a valid parent and child.
Proof. We present the proof for only parent selection; a similar proof holds for the child selection
case. First, let the system have N nodes. Rank all the nodes from 0 to (N − 1); a lower rank is
assigned to a node with a higher availability. Now, consider a colluder node x in the group that is
at rank r. Due to parent selection, and since there are an expected ( rN ·M) colluders with higher
availability than x, the expected number of colluders that are valid parents of x is:
min
(
K
N · Nr , 1.0
) (
r
N ·M
)
= min
(
K ·M
N ,
r·M
N
)
.
Now, the probability of a colluder node having rank r < K is = KN , thus the probability that
no colluders in the group have rank < K is = (1 − KN )M ≥ 1− M·KN = 1− o(1). Here we have
used the fact that (1− x)a ≥ 1− a · x for x ∈ [0, 1), a > 0. Thus, there are no colluders with rank
< K w.h.p. This means we can ignore the second term ( r·MN ) within the min expression above.
Next, for a colluder node x at rank r, and another colluder node y at rank i (> r), the
probability that x is a valid parent of y is =
K ·M
N
i . Since there are an expected (
N−r
N ·M) colluders
with higher rank than node x, the probability that no colluder nodes will be valid children of x is:
Πcolluders,i>r
(
1− K ·M
N · i
)
≥
(
1− K ·M
N · r
)N−r
N
·M
≥
(
1− K ·M
2
N2
· N − r
r
)
Finally, the probability no node pair from among the M colluders are related as valid
parent-children is:
Πcolluders,r
(
1− K ·M
2
N2
· N − r
N
)
≥
(
1− K ·M
2
N
)M
≥
(
1− K ·M
3
N
)
= 1− o(1)
Theorem 5.8.3. Suppose there is a group of M colluding nodes selected randomly across the node
population, with M ≪ 3
√
N
K
(i.e., K ·M
3
N = o(1)). Then, during an epoch where at least one pair
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among these colludes, the 2-hop auditing scheme discovers at least one colluding pair w.h.p.
Proof. From Theorem 5.8.2, it is true w.h.p. that no node pair is a valid parent-child. Thus, if
some nodes collude as parent-child during an epoch, there will be a chain of such colluders created
by tree child to tree parent relationships. Yet, since the sink is a non-colluder, we are assured that
any such chain will end in a non-colluder node. This non-colluder will, due to the described
auditing, detect collusions of the two chain nodes right below it in the tree.
5.8.2 Discovering Valid Children/Parents
In order to discover valid children in child selection (respectively valid parents in parent selection),
we leverage a decentralized shuﬄing membership service such as CYCLON [100], T-Man [49], or
AVMON’s coarse view (Section 3.7.3). A decentralized shuﬄing protocol service maintains, at each
node, a partial and weakly consistent list of nodes, in such a way that the list is (i) a random
selection and (ii) is constantly changed (shuﬄed). This maintenance depends on gossiping, i.e., a
node will periodically contact a peer chosen uniformly at random from the network, and then
exchange information. The entries in the list are updated lazily, thus some may be stale and point
to oﬄine nodes. The probabilistic-shuﬄing ensures that given two nodes x and y that are online
for long enough, the entry for node y will eventually appear in the membership list at node x.
We discuss below the actions for the child selection variant; parent selection is analogous.
Each node maintains a list of valid children at all times. Each node frequently and periodically
executes the following two actions. (1) It iterates through its current membership list and
evaluates the consistent condition on each entry (see Sections 5.7.1, 5.7.2). Any entries that satisfy
the consistent condition are added to the list of valid children. (2) The node also re-evaluates the
consistent condition on its current list of valid children; any entries no longer satisfying the
condition are removed from the valid children list. Notice that these steps involve querying the
availability service for each of the checked nodes2
Since a similar mechanism was presented and analyzed in Section 4.7.1, we do not reproduce
its analysis here. It suffices to mention that a membership list size of
√
N per node achieves quick
discovery with reasonably low bandwidth of (105 Bps for N = 1 million) and memory (6.3 KB).
The average discovery time is 5 hours (for N = 1 million), which is reasonable given the uptime of
nodes in P2P systems (e.g., 20%-30% of the nodes observed at any time in a P2P system have an
2Alternatively, AVCOL could leverage AVMEM’s availability-aware membership to discover valid children and
valid parents; but we decided that in order to study AVCOL’s behavior and properties in isolation, we would chose
to use a more modest approach than AVMEM.
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uptime longer than one day [94]), Grids, and PlanetLab. Finally, due to the probabilistic shuﬄing
of the membership list, this mechanism guarantees eventual discovery of valid children that satisfy
the consistent condition for long enough.
We reiterate that an uncollaborative node cannot manipulate the membership protocol to
increase its own inclusion probability. This is because adding or deleting membership entries, or
refusing to participate in the membership protocol, only affects the discovery time of valid
parents/children, but does not change the consistent selection criteria.
5.8.3 Periodic Auditing
While the per-aggregation audit of Section 5.8.1 detected colluding nodes not satisfying the
consistent condition, it did not detect selfish nodes that during some epoch, send their data to
multiple valid parents that satisfy the consistent condition. A node may do this in order to
increase its own inclusion probability, and the multiple valid parents could either be its colluders
or non-colluders. Such behavior is detected by periodic auditing operations, which we describe
below. Periodic auditing is initiated by each node asynchronous, lazily and infrequently, and at a
much lower frequency than the parent/child discovery of Section 5.8.2.
In order to enable periodic audits, each node keeps two types of additional state. First, the
node keeps a log history of all aggregate messages received from each of its tree children, for all
past epochs since the last periodic audit operation it initiated. Second, the node x maintains a list
of the step-parents of each of its own valid children. In other words, x maintains, for each of its
own tree children c that have sent x past aggregates, all the valid potential tree parents of node c.
For child selection, discovery of step-parents can be started whenever the valid child is discovered.
For parent selection, this discovery is started when the first aggregate is received from this child.
Notice though that if a child never sends an aggregate to x, it does not really need to be audited.
Step-parent discovery is implemented using gossiping — the step-parents of such valid children
c are discovered in a similar manner to Section 5.8.2, i.e., by frequently and periodically snooping
on the membership list at x, and checking (via the consistent condition) whether any of the
membership list entries are valid parents of c. In addition, node x keeps this list up to date by
periodically checking the consistent condition, purging out entries that are no longer valid
step-parents. Due to the probabilistically-shuﬄed nature of the membership list, this mechanism
ensures eventual detection of all step-parents of valid children.
Node x then uses the above additional state to initiate infrequent and periodic audit
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operations for its valid children. Specifically, for each valid child c, the periodic audit operation is
executed as follows. Node x contacts all the known step-parents of c, and sends to each of them a
log-slice for c. The log-slice for c is a list of aggregates signed by c, and received at x since the
latest periodic audit initiated at x. Audit messages are signed by the initiator node x, and contain
a sequence number differentiating it from previous audits by x. Each step-parent z upon receiving
such an audit message containing a log slice, first verifies whether x is a valid parent of c — if not,
z has a verifiable, non-repudiable and non-forgeable proof that x generated a spurious audit. If the
verification succeeds, z sends back to x its log-slice for c, i.e., all the aggregation messages that z
received from node c since its last audit.
Now, whenever node x hears back from a step-parent of c, it compares the received log-slice
with its own log-slice. It checks to see if there is any common epoch across both slices (recall that
log entries are signed and thus verifiable). If no epoch is common, node x does nothing. However, if
there is a common epoch across the two log-slices, then node x has a verifiable, non-repudiable and
non-forgeable proof that node c sent aggregation messages to multiple parents during an epoch.
Finally, whenever node x finds that a node c has stopped being a valid child (e.g., if its
availability changed so the consistent condition is no longer true), it immediately audits c, treating
it as a periodic audit. This ensures that x is able to audit its remaining log history for c, and
subsequently purges this log history.
The overhead of auditing is on expectation O(K ) messages. Since Theorem 5.8.2 showed that
all the valid parents of a node are not its colluders w.h.p., we have:
Theorem 5.8.4. Suppose all the valid parents of a node x have discovered each other as
step-parents. If x sends data to multiple valid parents during any subsequent epoch, the periodic
auditing will eventually detect this behavior.
In practice, it is possible that a node’s availability varies so much that its valid parents are
unable to discover each other before they become invalid. Our experiments next evaluate how
much real availability traces affect the success of periodic auditing.
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Chapter 6
Experiments
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of our AVMON, AVMEM, and AVCOL
implementations in a variety of distributed system settings. In order to do this, we choose the
approach of simulation. This allows us to evaluate our systems under several workload traces of
availability variation (i.e., churn), ranging from synthetic models, to traces obtained from real
systems (PlanetLab and Overnet).
Each section below details the protocol-specific metrics that were chosen to study
characteristics such as efficiency and scalability, tolerance to churn and failure, and resilience to
selfish and colluding behavior, among other characteristics.
Our systems are implemented in C. All our trace-driven discrete event simulations were run on
a 2.80GHz Intel P4 CPU machine with 2GB RAM and Fedora Core Linux. Both AVMEM and
AVCOL are built atop AVMON, which provides both the availability monitoring service and the
probabilistically-shuﬄed membership protocol that AVMEM and AVCOL require.
Before describing our experiments, we introduce the one set of traces that is common to
AVMON, AVMEM, and AVCOL.
Overnet Traces: Traces from the Overnet P2P file sharing network [12] are the common
real-life data-set used across AVMON, AVMEM, and AVCOL experiments. They provide realism
by allowing us to inject churn, i.e., availability variation, into our systems. These traces were
originally collected over a 7 day period, at 20 minute intervals, across a population of 2400
uniquely identified nodes. The traces are injected as such, without modification, into our systems.
Notice that the availability for 50% of the hosts is 0.3 measured over the 7 days, i.e., the traces
inject a lot of churn into our systems.
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For all values of N from 100 to 2000, at
least 96% of the nodes were discovered in
under 30 seconds.
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Figure 6.1: Variation of discovery time, when varying system size in the STAT,SYNTH,SYNTH-BD
models.
6.1 AVMON
We studied the effect of five different availability (or churn) models. These fall into three classes —
(I) synthetic churn models (labeled in our plots as STAT,SYNTH, and SYNTH-BD), (II) churn traces
from PlanetLab all-pairs-pings (labeled PL) [39], and (III) traces from the Overnet P2P system
(labeled OV) [12]. STAT models a static network with no churn, while SYNTH models a system where
nodes join and leave under exponential and memoryless rates (each 0.2N60 per min, giving per-hour
a 20% join rate, and 20% leave rate), but there are no births or deaths. SYNTH-BD extends this
with node birth and death, following exponential and memoryless rates (each 0.2N1440 per min, giving
per-day a 20% birth rate, and 20% death rate). All models in category (I) ensure a stable system
size, i.e., number of online nodes. PL,OV neither have a stable system size nor an exponential
assumption, but instead reflect the true availability traces. PL and OV traces were originally once
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each sec and once each 20 min respectively, and are injected as such.
In all these scenarios, we used the Optimal-MDC variant with the following default settings:
1. coarse view protocol period (see Section 3.7.3) Tcv = 1 min;
2. per-node coarse view size cvs = 4 · 4
√
N , where N was the stable system size for
STAT,SYNTH,SYNTH-BD, and the long-term average system size for PL and OV (we set
cvs = 4 · cvsOptimal−MDC for performance reasons);
3. parameter K = log2(N) (see Section 3.7.2);
4. for H(.), libSSL’s [4] MD5 implementation using the first 64 returned bits;
5. forgetful pinging parameters τ = 2 min, c = 1 (see Section 3.7.4);
6. monitoring protocol period TM = 1 min (see Section 3.7.4).
The metrics of interest measured in the following sections are discovery time, along with
memory, computation, and bandwidth overheads. Each experiment on each of the plots shown
below was run for 48 hours. Each point on each plot depicts the average across relevant nodes
considered.
6.1.1 Effect of Varying System Size in the STAT,SYNTH,SYNTH-BD Models
This section shows the effect of varying system size N , ranging from 100 to 2000, on the synthetic
models STAT, SYNTH, and SYNTH-BD. We used an initial warm-up period of 1 hour where nodes
were born, died, joined, and left according to the respective model. For STAT and SYNTH, a control
group, consisting of a new set of nodes numbering 10% of the stable system size, was then made to
join simultaneously, in order to measure discovery time of their monitors. Control group nodes
subsequently follow the churn model. For SYNTH-BD, the control group was implicit, and contained
some nodes born after the warm-up stage.
Discovery Time
Although the expected number of monitors K = log2(N), we first measure, for each control group
node, the time to find at least one of its monitors, i.e., the “discovery time of the first monitor.”
Figure 6.1(a) plots the average time to discovery of the first monitor for each node in the control
group. For each point on the plot, the average was taken over all measured discovery times, but by
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Figure 6.2: Average discovery times of first L monitors (L on x-axis) for each node in control group,
for the three synthetic models.
ignoring the one highest measured discovery time datapoint for that setting. Such points are
ignored because they are outliers (the top ignored values were 110 min, 72 min, and 42 min) and
would skew our conclusions if included. This plot illustrates two observations about the average
discovery time: (1) it stayed consistently below 1 minute (recall that the protocol period itself was
Tcv = 1 minute), and (2) it was not affected by joins and leaves (compare STAT and SYNTH lines),
although it appeared to be affected by births and deaths (compare SYNTH and SYNTH-BD lines). For
the SYNTH-BD setting, discovery time was measured from among the new nodes born after the
warm-up — these numbered as 47 for N = 100, 198 for N = 500, 390 for N = 1000, and 785 for
N = 2000.
Yet, discovery stayed fast in spite of births and deaths. Figures 6.1(b) and 6.1(c) show the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the discovery time for the two models STAT and
SYNTH-BD. Observe that in each of these settings, at least 93% of first monitors were discovered
within 60 seconds. To wrap up, Figure 6.2 shows the average times to discover, for each node, the
first L monitors of the node. This plot illustrates that for all churn models, PS(.) nodes were
discovered at uniform time intervals. Thus, we conclude that AVMON’s discovery time stays low,
regardless of birth, death, join and rejoin.
We can estimate the discovery time of the first monitor for N > 2000. Specifically, the E[D]
from Figure 6.1(a) is about 20 s for N = 2000 (SYNTH-BD). Further, the discovery time for any
given monitor of a given node grows as
√
N (Section 3.8.2, Optimal-MDC), and the system has
K = log2N . Thus, the discovery time for the first monitor at system online size N is
= 20 ·
√
N
log2N
· log22000√
2000
. For N = 1 Billion nodes, the first monitor discovery time turns out to be
1.44 hours; this is smaller than the average uptime in Overnet (which is several hours).
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Figure 6.3: Average computations per time unit (with 1 standard deviation), averaged over all
control group nodes, for STAT,SYNTH,SYNTH-BD models.
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Figure 6.4: CDF of the computational overhead from Figure 6.3.
Computational Overhead
Figure 6.3 shows that the average computations per second per node varied sublinearly with N ,
and the per-minute overhead was close to 2 · cvs2. Figure 6.4 shows the CDF across nodes. The
data showed that even for N = 2000, the worst-case computation at any node was 0.611 ms per
minute, about 1% of the CPU. Together, these plots show that the computational overhead of
AVMON is not influenced much by churn.
Memory Usage
The memory at each node x, due to (CV (x)| + |PS(x)|+ |TS(x)|), is plotted in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.6 shows the CDF. The measured memory utilization was close to the expected value of
(2K + cvs). For instance, when N = 2000 (and K = 11, cvs = 27), Figure 6.5 shows that for STAT,
the average per-node memory stayed below the expected value of 49 entries. For SYNTH,
SYNTH-BD, the average was only slightly above that expected, primarily because of garbage entries
in PS(.), TS(.) sets. Finally, in Figure 6.6, from the CDF’s for N = 2000, we conclude that the
memory usage of AVMON is minimally influenced by churn.
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Figure 6.6: CDF of the memory overhead from Figure 6.5.
Bandwidth
The average outgoing bandwidth for the STAT model is (K + cvs) per minute. For N = 2000 (with
K = 11, cvs = 27), 8B per coarse view entry, 8B per monitoring ping message, this turned out to
be 5.067Bps per node. Section 6.1.4 studies bandwidth in more detail.
6.1.2 Effect of Varying Coarse View Size in STAT Model
We study the effect of varying cvs. In order to isolate varying cvs from churn, we used the STAT
model with the following values for cvs: ({4, 6, 8, 10} · 4√N). Even under the SYNTH model, the
indegree distribution of the coarse view graph was quite uniform: for N = 2000, cvs = 27, 85%
nodes had indegree=27, and only 2% had smaller indegree.
Figure 6.7 shows that the discovery time (average and standard deviation) decreased as cvs
increased. The curve for each value of N has a knee at its third data point — increasing cvs
beyond this (cvs = 8 · 4√N , e.g., for N = 2000, cvs ≃ 54), did not improve either the average or
variance of discovery time by much. Figure 6.8 plots both the memory utilization (left y-axis) and
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Figure 6.8: Memory entries vs. cvs, and computations per minute vs. cvs on STAT churn model.
the computational overhead per node (right y-axis). First, notice that for a fixed value of cvs, N
had no influence on either memory or computational overhead. Second, increasing cvs too much
beyond the curve’s knee (from Figure 6.7) raised the computational overhead. Yet, for practical
purposes, this overhead is negligible — even for cvs = 68, the expected 9375.79 hashes would take
only about 3.52 ms to execute (once per minute with a P4 2.1 GHz processor under WinXP SP 1,
C++ Visual .NET 2003). Third, the memory varied linearly with cvs — even for cvs = 68,
memory usage was 728B (assuming 8B per CV entry). Thus, in practice, the value of cvs should
be set based on the knee of the curve from Figure 6.7.
6.1.3 Effect of PlanetLab Traces, Overnet Traces, and a High-churn
Model
We study the effect of injecting availability traces from PlanetLab (PL) and from Overnet (OV). For
PL, we set N = 239, and K = 8, cvs = 16. For OV, we had N = 550, and K = 9, cvs = 19.
Figure 6.9 shows the CDF for discovery time of each node’s first monitor. In OV, a total of
Nlongterm = 1319 nodes had been born after two days — 97.27% of these had discovered their first
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Figure 6.9: CDF of Discovery time of first monitors, for each of PL and OV traces.
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Figure 6.10: CDF of number of memory entries per node, for each of PL and OV traces.
monitors within 63 seconds after birth. For PL, Nlongterm = 239 after 2 days, and over 98% of
nodes’ first monitors were discovered within a minute after birth. Figure 6.10 shows that per-node
memory utilization was uniformly distributed across nodes. The OV line shows that node birth and
death cause memory utilization to be higher than the expected value (of 19 + 2 · 9 = 37), but no
node had over 81 memory entries. For PL, the maximum entry count was 44.
Finally, to study the effect of very high churn, we used a new churn model called SYNTH-BD2.
This resembled SYNTH-BD, but had twice the birth and death rate (i.e., λb = λd =
0.4N
1440 per min).
Figure 6.11 shows that this made no noticeable difference in discovery time, illustrating that
AVMON discovery is churn-resistant. Figure 6.12 shows the additional memory entries due to the
increased churn in SYNTH-BD2 was less than 10% over that in SYNTH-BD.
6.1.4 Forgetful Pinging, Optimizations
We evaluated the practical benefits of the forgetful pinging optimization (see Section 3.7.4) for the
SYNTH churn model. For this experiment, AVMON estimated each node’s availability as the
fraction of monitoring pings sent to that node which receive a response back. For N = 2000,
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Figure 6.11: CDFs for the discovery time of first monitors, compared between two high-churn models.
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Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.13: Ratio of estimated availability to actual availability, with and without the forgetful
pinging optimization.
Figure 6.13 plots the ratio, for each node in the control group, of its estimated availability to its
real availability (i.e., actual fraction uptime). While the lack of the forgetful ping optimization
(“NON-Forgetful ping in plot”) measured availability accurately, the plot for the “Forgetful ping”
optimization had an average relative error of less than 5%, with a maximal error of 8%. In turn,
Figure 6.14 shows that the optimization reduced bandwidth consumed by “useless pings” (sent by
a node to nodes not currently in the system), by an order of magnitude.
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Figure 6.14: Forgetful pinging reduces useless pings sent to absent nodes. Bars show 1 standard
deviation.
Bandwidth
Figure 6.15 shows the CDF for the Outgoing Bytes per Second (BW) that nodes incurred in the
STAT and OV models. First, in STAT, with N = 2000 total nodes, 88% of the nodes had an outgoing
bandwidth below 10Bps. Notice that about 6.5% of nodes had a BW above 50Bps. We surmise
that this was due to the static nature of the STAT model, which caused indegree degradation,
which in turn caused responses to the excessive received pings. To address this, we introduced an
optimization (called “PR2”) whereby a node that had not received a monitoring ping for two
successive protocol periods would force all its coarse view nodes to add it to their own coarse
views. Figure 6.15 shows that this variant (labeled “STAT-PR2”) reduced bandwidth further for
the STAT model — the outgoing bandwidth was below 9Bps. In contrast, notice that in the
Overnet churn traces (OV), there was constant change in the coarse views due to node birth, death,
join, and leave, and consequently, the outgoing bandwidth was more uniform, with 99.85% of the
nodes spending below 11Bps.
6.1.5 Overreporting and Collusion
There are two fundamental ways to “attack” the reliability of AVMON’s results, when the intention
is to maliciously improve a node’s reported availability. (1) A node x can report 100% availability
for a legitimate TS(x) member node y — regardless of y’s actual availability. (2) An increasingly
larger set of colluding nodes in the network raises the chances that AVMON’s results cannot be
trusted. We call these attacks overreporting and (legitimate) pollution of colluder pinging sets.
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Figure 6.16: Fraction of nodes with above 0.2 error in measured availability, with some nodes
overreporting all TS(.) nodes’ availabilities as 100%.
Effect of Overreporting Attack
The experiment for Figure 6.16 had a fraction of nodes (x-axis) report 100% availabilities for all
their TS(.) nodes. The plot shows that the fraction of nodes whose measured availability
(averaged over their PS(.) nodes) differed from their actual availability by over 0.2, was very small
for all the four models SYNTH,SYTNH-BD,PL,OV, and only 3.5% nodes were affected in the worst
data point (for OV).
Pollution of Colluder Pinging Sets
Section 3.8.3 showed that AVMON can tolerate w.h.p. colluder set sizes = o( Nlog(N) ). We now
analyze the effect of varying the fraction of nodes in a single (large) colluder set. Since Byzantine
fault-tolerant protocols can tolerate one-third of nodes being uncooperative, we say a PS() is
polluted if at least one-third of it consists of colluders. Figure 6.17 shows the probability of a
colluder’s converged PS() being polluted (“pollution probability”), versus the fraction of colluders.
Although the plot is for N = 10K nodes, the same results hold for any N . We observe two facts:
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Figure 6.17: PS() pollution among colluders. N = 10000,K = 14.
(1) with under 10% colluder nodes, the pollution probability is very small; (2) if one wished to keep
the pollution probability smaller than the colluder fraction, this is true for colluder groups smaller
than 25% — thus, w.r.t. this requirement, AVMON tolerates up to 25% nodes being colluders.
6.1.6 Conclusion
Our experiments showed that AVMON performs well under a variety of churn models — Overnet
and PlanetLab availability traces, and thre synthetic models. AVMON is scalable, efficient, with
fast monitor discovery, and resilient to selfish and colluding nodes.
6.2 AVMEM
In evaluating AVMEM, in order to be realistic, we inject churn (availability variation) traces from
the Overnet P2P system [12] into our system. PlanetLab traces were not used because of their low
rate of churn. By default, we build and use AVMEM overlays using the two sub-predicates of
Logarithmic Vertical Sliver (equation 4.3) and Logarithmic-Constant Horizontal Sliver (equation
4.6), from Section 4.6. We evaluate both the AVMEM overlay (Section 6.2.1) as well as the
management operations atop it (Section 6.2.2).
The metrics of interest in the AVMEM experiments are the distribution of the nodes in both
the V S and HS, compared to the actual availability distribution; resilience to selfish flooding and
false positives; accuracy, latency and overhead of the anycast and multicast operations.
6.2.1 Microbenchmarks: AVMEM Overlay Properties
We evaluate whether the number of horizontal and vertical sliver neighbors in our implementation
follow theoretical predictions. The system was allowed to warm up for 24 hours, and a snapshot
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Figure 6.18: System Snapshot of Online Nodes. There are 442 nodes online at the time of the
snapshot. Each dot in the plot stands for a node.
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was taken of online nodes. Figure 6.18(a) shows that the availability distribution of online nodes in
this snapshot is highly skewed, making this trace set a good test for our algorithms.
Figure 6.18(b) and Figure 6.18(c) respectively show the distributions of horizontal sliver size
and vertical sliver size at all these online nodes. From Figure 6.18(c), it is clear that the median
values of the vertical sliver sizes are uncorrelated to the availability, as expected. Figure 6.18(b)
shows an increasing median value of the horizontal sliver size with node availability. Yet,
Figure 6.19 demonstrates that this increase is only sublinear — the horizontal sliver size grows
sublinearly with the total number of nodes present within ±ǫ availability. Finally, Figure 6.20
counts the total number of incoming vertical sliver links to nodes in different availability ranges.
We observe that this number is largely uncorrelated to the distribution of nodes (seen in
Figure 6.18(a)). Thus, we conclude that the AVMEM slice sizes follow theoretical analysis, even
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Figure 6.21: Flooding Attack: Fraction of peers that are not currently neighbors that would accept
communications. Measurement averaged across 0.1-wide availability ranges.
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Figure 6.22: Legitimate Rejection Rate: Fraction of nodes that will reject communications from an
AVMEM in-neighbor. Measurement averaged across 0.1-wide availability ranges.
under a realistic churn model.
Attack Analysis
We first evaluate the effect of a flooding attack, where a selfish (or malicious) node wishes to send
out a message to all nodes that are not part of its AVMEM neighbor list(s). Although each node
checks each incoming message to verify if its sender is a valid in-neighbor (according to the
AVMEM predicate), and reject it if not, this is open to attacks due to several reasons: (1) nodes
may use cached and stale availability information to do this check, and (2) availability information
reported by our underlying AVMON service could give inconsistent or inaccurate answers.
Figure 6.21 (line for cushion=0) depicts that regardless of the availability of the selfish node, fewer
than 10% of nodes outside of its AVMEM neighbor list accept its flooding message. This is
reasonable — it means that to receive an audience from one additional peer, a selfish node must
obtain information about 10 additional peers.
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Second, we evaluate how the above inaccuracies and cached information affect the rejection of
valid messages sent to AVMEM neighbors. Figure 6.22 shows that this number is below 30%
regardless of the sending node’s availability. To reduce this effect further, we add a constant
cushion to the right hand side of equation (4.1) in Section 4.6, i.e., to function f . This reduces the
rejection rate to below 20% while slightly increasing the effect of flooding attacks (see also
Figure 6.21). This is reasonable — it means that a node attempting to forward a message will
have to try only an expected 10.8 = 1.25 neighbors before succeeding. From these two attacks, we
conclude that AVMEM provides uniform attack resilience and acceptance rate for legitimate
messages, independent of the sending node’s availability.
6.2.2 Management Operations over AVMEM
In order to explore anycasts and multicasts systematically, we select the initiator node in one of
three ways, and the target range in one of three ways, thus effectively giving us nine combinations
for each management operation. Although we evaluated all the nine combinations, for brevity, we
show data for only the most interesting ones below. Specifically, the initiator is chosen as either (1)
LOW ∈ [0, 0.3333), or (2) MID ∈ [0.3333, 0.6666), or (3) HIGH ∈ [0.6666, 1.0). For threshold operations
(anycasts or multicasts), the target availability range was either 0.25, or 0.49 or 0.90. For range
operations, the target availability range was either one of [0.2, 0.3], or [0.44, 0.54], [0.85, 0.95]. Each
point on any plot is the average of 5 different protocol runs, each with 50 messages.
Basic Anycast Operations
We first evaluate anycast based on greedy forwarding using VS-only, HS-only, and HS+VS, as well
as simulated annealing with HS+VS (see Section 4.7.2). The retried-greedy variation will be
discussed soon. All anycasts are sent with TTL = 6. Among the nine options discussed above, the
following four settings were the most interesting. First, Figure 6.23 shows the results for a
range-anycast experiment with initiator in the MID and target [0.85, 0.95]. All variants gave a 100%
success rate for messages, with all except HS-only finishing w.h.p. within 1 hop. This makes
intuitive sense as messages will not travel far in availability space by using HS-only.
Second, Figure 6.24 shows the number of delivered range anycasts out of 50 sent, from nodes
in availability range HIGH to three different target availability ranges: [0.85, 0.95], [0.44, 0.54], and
[0.2, 0.3]. The third of these is the harshest scenario, since it is very likely that either (1) there are
no nodes online in the low availability ranges, or (2) the anycast takes a longer path via
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low-availability nodes, and thus has a high probability of being dropped inside the overlay, as its
TTL expires. Of the multiple options, HS+VS comes out the best.
Retried-Greedy Anycast
Figure 6.25 shows the reliability and latency of retried-greedy forwarding, for different values of
retry, under the harshest possible scenario of the initiator in HIGH and target range [0.2, 0.3]. The
latency on each virtual hop here was selected uniformly at random from the interval [20ms, 80ms].
Notice that even under such harsh scenarios, retry = 8 gives as good a performance as the 60%
delivery plateau, with a low average latency of 739ms.
Benefit of AVMEM Predicate
In order to compare the usefulness of the horizontal (logarithmic-constant) and vertical
(logarithmic) sub-predicates used in the above AVMEM overlay, we ran exactly the same
range-anycast operation from Figure 6.25, but over a random overlay graph similar to those
created by alternative membership protocols like SCAMP [36], CYCLON [100], T-MAN [100], etc.
For fairness, the outdegree of each node in the random graph is O(log(N∗)). Figure 6.26 shows the
data for this, and should be compared against Figure 6.25. A look at these figures tells us that for
management operations: (1) overlays based on AVMEM predicates give a higher success rate than
random graphs, while (2) both achieve similar latencies.
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Multicast Operations
Figure 6.27 shows the latency performance of range- and threshold-multicast, using both flooding
(default) and lower-cost gossip (fanout = 5, Ng = 2, gossip period=1 s). The latency for each
multicast is the worst case, i.e., it is the time of the last receiving node obtaining the multicast.
The CDF shows that this stays below 300ms for flooding, and 5.5s for gossiping. Figure 6.28 shows
that the spam factor for multicasts is low, i.e., the fraction of multicasts overflowing the target
range, and reaching a node outside is below 8% for most cases, except the topmost case where
data is skewed by the small number of nodes in the target range. Finally, Figure 6.29 shows that
flooding gets a reliability above 90%, while gossip reaches 70%. Bandwidth savings due to gossip
may thus be worthwhile to applications less concerned about reliability.
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6.2.3 Conclusion
We conclude that AVMEM is capable of building an availability-aware overlay, efficiently and
scalably. Anycast operations can be implemented effectively on top of AVMEM. Multicasting has
good latency, is reliable, and with low spam ratio. Selfish nodes are kept under control by the
predicates.
6.3 AVCOL
As in AVMEM’s evaluation, we only inject churn traces from the Overnet P2P system into
AVCOL. PlanetLab traces were not used because of their low rate of churn.
The two most important metrics in this evaluation are node coverage and satisfaction of
aggregation predicates — the former is important because we do not want nodes to be left out
during an aggregation round; the latter is important because we need to verify that the protocols
properly implement the expected behavior of the predicates. Additionally, we are concerned about
AVCOL’s resilience to selfish and colluding nodes, and AVCOL’s overhead.
Parameter settings
Unless otherwise noted, all experiments use the following settings. We use a value of N = 525
based on an estimate of the number of online nodes in the Overnet traces. Each node maintains a
partial and weakly consistent list of other nodes in the system, L, with the number of entries fixed
at |L| = ⌈√N⌉ = 23. In our implementation we use AVMON’s CV (.) as L, thus the underlying
AVMON system updates L periodically every 60 seconds (Section 5.8.2) — a longer period could
be used, but AVMON’s background bandwidth is only 6.81 Bps for 2000 nodes. AVCOL also
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Figure 6.30: Fraction of orphan nodes vs K for child selection, without and with adoption.
maintains, at each node, a list (V) of valid children (if child selection is used), or valid parents (if
parent selection is used). List V is refreshed once every four minutes (Section 5.8.2). Parameter K
is chosen as ⌈1.75 · ⌈log2(N)⌉⌉ = 18 (justified in our first experiment). Finally, we set fanout = K
in all experiments.
6.3.1 Node Coverage
We evaluate the coverage of our AVCOL trees, considering only child selection and no selfish or
colluding nodes. A node is covered if it is reachable from the sink via a path of tree parent-child
pointers. Uncovered nodes are said to be orphaned. Coverage improves as we increase the value of
K in our algorithm (Section 5.7); we choose K = ⌈c · ⌈log2(N)⌉⌉, and vary c. The upper curve in
Figure 6.30 shows the percentage of online nodes that are left orphaned as K is varied from 10 to
30. Each datapoint on the plot is an average taken over 200 epochs. It can be seen that beyond
K = 18 (c = 1.75) a plateau is reached and only about 10% nodes are orphans. This motivated
our default value for K .
Optimization: The number of orphans can be reduced by sink redirection (Section 5.7.1). We
implement this as adoption: if a node has been (1) not covered for at least O epochs, and (2) no
online node is a valid parent, then the sink will adopt the node as a child. Although this second
condition is not required for our algorithm, existence of valid parents can be checked by having
parents send periodic heartbeat messages to valid children. The lower curve in Figure 6.30 shows
that with O = 10, fewer than 2% nodes are orphaned. We also observed that in all simulation runs,
all orphans were covered within 10 epochs. Finally, we observed that the sink had to adopt only a
few orphaned nodes to reach full coverage; this is because an adopted node’s descendants are also
automatically covered by the adopted node, thus naturally avoiding scalability issues at the sink.
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Figure 6.31: Probability of inclusion of a node as a function of its availability. Line shows predicate,
and datapoints are per-node.
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Figure 6.32: Ratio of colluding links to non-colluding links as a function of colluder group size.
6.3.2 Satisfying Aggregation Predicates
The main goal of AVCOL was to satisfy global predicates g relating each node x’s inclusion
probability to its availability av(x), as g(av(x)). Figure 6.31 shows the predicate satisfaction for
three specific predicates, under parent selection and no selfish or colluding nodes: (1) linear,
g(x) = av(x); (2) quadratic, g(x) = av(x)2; (3) bimodal, if (av(x) > 0.5) g(x) = 1.0 else
g(x) = 0.0. For these plots, the AVCOL system was allowed to warm up for 13 hours (simply to
allow collection of a long trace for validation), and 200 epochs were generated simultaneously and
independently. Each datapoint on these plots is an average over 200 epochs, and corresponds to
one node. For each datapoint, the y-axis value shows the fraction of the node’s online epochs
during which its own value was included in the global aggregate at the sink. The x-axis value plots
the availability of that node as reported by AVMON. The plot shows that in spite of the
distributed nature of the aggregation, predicates are satisfied by child selection trees in AVCOL.
The results for parent selection were similar, and are not plotted.
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Figure 6.33: Linear global predicate with child selection when 10% (dots) and 50% (crosses) of the
nodes are colluding.
6.3.3 Effect of Colluding Nodes
We create a colluding group of nodes by randomly selecting a sizable fraction of nodes. Colluders
follow valid parent-child relationships and the rest of the AVCOL protocol, except that during
each epoch every colluder node: (a) prefers as tree parent (resp. tree children) all colluders that
occur among its valid parents (resp. valid children); and (b) includes its colluder tree children’s
values with probability 1.0 in the aggregate that it passes up to its own tree parent.
First, Figure 6.32 plots the effect of colluder group sizes ranging from 10% to 75% of the node
population. Even with 25% of the nodes in a colluding group, only about 5% of the valid
parent-child links are between colluder pairs (in parent selection). This shows the advantage of
using the consistent condition of Section 5.7. Next, Figure 6.33 shows the effect on the linear
global predicate of two colluder groups — 10% and 50% of the node population. We make two
observations: (1) with 10% of the nodes in a colluding group, the predicate satisfaction is
indistinguishable from Figure 6.31, and (2) even with 50% nodes in the colluding group, the
predicate satisfaction does not degrade much.
6.3.4 Selfish Nodes Using Multiple Parents
We study the effect of “greedy nodes”, i.e., selfish nodes that forward data to multiple valid
parents. Due to the varying availability of nodes and potentially inconsistent availabilities reported
by AVMON, a greedy node may take a while to be detected by the periodic audit operations of
Section 5.8.3 — recall that step-parent discovery, to perform auditing, depends on a gossip-based
partial membership list. In this experiment, we select a few greedy nodes and have them send data
to multiple valid parents (2, 4, or 6), during just one epoch. We allow AVCOL to function
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Figure 6.34: Fraction of greedy nodes caught by periodic audit, as a function of audit frequency.
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Figure 6.35: Number of messages per-aggregation.
normally, but vary the frequency of periodic auditing. Figure 6.3.4 shows, for child selection, the
fraction of greedy nodes caught as a function of the time between the epoch and the next periodic
audit. We make these observations: (1) the more greedy a node is (#parents data sent to), the
quicker it will be caught, (2) if a greedy node sends data to 4 or more parents, an auditing
frequency over once per hour will catch the greedy node, (3) greedy nodes sending to 2 parents or
fewer, require a higher auditing frequency (once every 20 min), and (4) lower frequency audits still
catch over half the greedy nodes, so a node that chooses to be greedy over several epochs will
eventually be caught.
6.3.5 Bandwidth and Latency
We compare child selection against parent selection. Figure 6.35 shows the cumulative distribution
(CDF) for per-aggregation number of messages. Figure 6.36 shows the CDF for background
bandwidth, arising from availability queries sent to the leveraged AVMON service. Figure 6.37
shows the latencies. Latency for a node is the time taken by its value to reach the sink, measured
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Figure 6.37: Latency of Parent Selection (periodic) vs. Child Selection (asynchronous).
from the epoch start time. The network latency between each node pair is selected uniformly at
random in the interval [20ms, 80ms] (larger latency than a LAN). We find that: (1) The mean
per-aggregation bandwidth in both variants is comparable (15 messages/epoch), however parent
selection has a lower median because many nodes are tree leaves and send only 1 message. (2) The
median background bandwidth for the two variants is 20 — 30 Bps. (3) Child selection has higher
latency (median: 700 ms) due to tree construction, while parent selection (median: 250 ms) is
faster due to periodic aggregation, avoiding the tree construction phase. Note that these latencies
are significantly lower than the remaining uptime — which measures in minutes and hours — of
any one node, at any time, on widely deployed P2P systems [94]. Furthermore, node failure would
affect, on expectation, aggregates originating on low availability nodes. Finally, note that
AVMON’s background bandwidth for 2000 nodes is 6.81 Bps. These low bandwidth numbers make
the system scalable.
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6.3.6 Conclusion
We conclude that AVCOL’s availability-aware global predicates work as expected, i.e., they
successfully relate each node’s inclusion propability in an aggregate, explicitly to the node’s
availability. Aggregation is fast and consumes low bandwidth. Additionally, useful predicates can
be satisfied in spite of many colluding nodes, and gossip-based auditing catches selfish nodes
quickly.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis has specified availability-dependent global predicates, and shown how they can be
efficiently and scalably realized for a class of distributed services, in spite of specific selfish and
colluding behaviors, using local and decentralized protocols.
First, we presented AVMON, the first distributed availability monitoring overlay, resilient to
selfish and colluding nodes that want to misrepresent their availability as higher than real. We
showed that AVMON is efficient, scalable, churn-resilient, and that its optimal variant
(Optimal-MDC) can rapidly find the monitor-target relationships.
Secondly, we presented AVMEM, the first availability-aware overlay. AVMEM efficiently uses
availability-dependent predicates to manage peer relationships, tolerating selfish nodes that would
like to flood the network with their messages, or spurious peer-relationships. We showed that
range/threshold multicast and range/threshold anycast can be implemented efficiently, and that
their availability-aware addressing has low spam ratio.
Third, we showed how to perform availability-aware aggregation in AVCOL, the first
availability-aware aggregation system. AVCOL efficiently implements availability-dependent
predicates, that relate the probability of inclusion of a node’s aggregate in the global aggregate to
that node’s availability. We showed that AVCOL can implement and realize arbitrary predicates
— our experiments showed that predicates are realized in spite of selfish and colluding nodes.
AVCOL is resilient to selfish nodes that try to forcibly add their aggregate to the global aggregate,
and can catch selfish nodes quickly.
Future Directions: There are many directions in which each of the contributions of this thesis
can be taken.
The ideas presented in AVMON can be extended to the distributed monitoring of new metrics
besides availability. The metrics can be system-level or application-level, each with their new
challenges, specially in the face of selfish and colluding nodes. This can be used to create
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“contribution-aware” distributed services, where the service received by a node will improve
depending on that node’s contribution with respect to a particular metric. Some related ideas are
mentioned in Section 1.2.
AVMON’s self-organization can be useful in cloud-computing clusters, where easing the
responsibilities of the administrators is important. Additionally, it can lead to research into better
monitoring of node failures, both intra-cluster and inter-cluster, with the goal of masking cluster
failure and improving the dependability of cloud-computing applications.
A middle-ground between fully-distributed monitoring and centralized monitoring can be
inspired by AVMON — consider a small set of “super-nodes” inside a cluster, where they partition
the target nodes to be monitored in a self-organizing way similar to AVMON. This middleground
can help adoption of P2P ideas in commercial systems.
AVMEM can be used to implement further availability-aware distributed protocols and
applications. For example, distributed applications like DHTs usually optimize their routing tables
by choosing nodes that are close in the network. They could be extended to choose nodes
according to their availability, thus decreasing the damage that churn can potentially cause on
DHTs, e.g., a partition.
Another direction suggested by AVMEM is the creation of new membership protocols, where
the relationships are based on a particular system-level or application-level metric, e.g., available
bandwidth, available storage, contributed CPU, percentage of messages forwarded. New and
interesting management operations can result from this work.
AVCOL suggests that new aggregation systems can be defined, where predicates bias the
inclusion probability of a node’s aggregate as a function some metric. It is also worth exploring
how availability-aware tree building could be applied in other environments, e.g., tree-based
multimedia streaming.
Energy constrained systems, such as sensor networks and mobile ad hoc networks, could take
advantage of the global predicate idea, by ignoring the link between node availability and service
received by the node from the system. Consider, for instance, a sensor network that realizes a
global predicate for aggregation, biased on remaining node energy, with a forwarding rule similar
to AVCOL’s, but using energy instead of availability. Some aggregates would not be forwarded all
the way to the sink, probabilistically biased by energy, similarly as to how AVCOL
probabilistically biases aggregate inclusion according to availability.
Finally, one can extend the concept and specification of global predicates, and their
96
decentralized realization, to other distributed services beyond monitoring, membership, and
aggregation.
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